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The first essay of my dissertation focuses on the incubation stage  the period 
between introduction of a technological change and its first commercialization  of an 
industry, which is an understudied phenomenon. It examines firms’ technological 
investments in a nascent industry in anticipation of commercialization, and contributes 
novel insights to the classic industry evolution literature that conceptualizes industry 
formation from the first instance of product. Using the agricultural biotechnology 
industry as the empirical context, this essay documents not only the extent to which firms 
undertake technological investments in anticipation of entry, but also the heterogeneity in 
types of entrants and their modes of value capture.  I thus shed light on the intertwined 
processes of economic value capture at the firm-level and ecosystem development at the 
industry-level that underpin incubation of nascent industries. 
The second essay examines the capability antecedents of a firm market entry into 
a nascent industry. A firm’s technical capabilities and complementary assets, at time of 
entry, have been consistently noted as key determinants of the likelihood of entry. 
Drawing on the premise that firms make deliberate decisions regarding technological 
investments well before they enter nascent markets, I make a distinction between a firm’s 
pre-entry and pre-investment capabilities and study the type of pre-investment 
capabilities that are related to the likelihood of firm entry. I suggest that a firm’s pre-
investment reconfiguration experiences are the critical capability:  these experiences 
shape the firm’s development of pre-entry technical capabilities and complementary 
assets, which in turn affect the likelihood of entry.  I find empirical support for the 
mediating role of pre-entry capabilities to the relationship between pre-investment 
experiences and the likelihood of entry in the context of the population of firms that 
conducted R&D investments in agricultural biotechnology between 1980 and 2010. 
The third essay studies the reconfiguration strategies pursued by firms in 
anticipation of entry into a nascent industry. Whether entry to a nascent industry is 
undertaken by de novo startups, diversifying firms from related industries or industry 
incumbents from the obsolescing industry, a critical strategic action for firms is to 
achieve the required configuration of capabilities for operations in the new industry. The 
choice, timing, and sequence of these capability reconfiguration mechanisms may, 
however, differ across different types of firms. I provide theoretical propositions that link 
firm types to the underlying sources of heterogeneity and suggest how this heterogeneity 
leads to differential paths undertaken by de novo startups, diversifying firms and industry 
incumbents while reconfiguring themselves in anticipation of entry into a nascent 
industry. Implications of the model are discussed using three firm case studies from the 
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Entrepreneurial entry of firms to new industries and the concomitant change in the 
technological regime and competitive landscape of industries have been associated with 
creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942). Much of the scholarly research in industry 
evolution and entrepreneurship has focused on the entry of entrepreneurial firms to new 
industries and performance implications of their entry vis-à-vis industry incumbents, defining 
a firm’s entry to a new industry as the point when the firm first commercializes a product 
within the new industry (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). Similarly, inception of an industry is 
conceptualized based on the first instance of product commercialization (Agarwal & Gort, 
1996; Gort & Klepper, 1982). My dissertation is based on the premise that studying 
entrepreneurial entry of firms to a new industry by considering the first product 
commercialization may provide an incomplete picture of which firms choose to enter a new 
industry and how firms and industries co-evolve.  
Indeed, technologies often undergo an incubation period, which I define as the period 
between the introduction of a discontinuous technological change and the first instance of 
product commercialization. During the incubation period, firms invest effort in transforming 
the invention to commercially valuable innovations. These efforts entail a reconfiguration of 
existing resource base and capability portfolio according to the requirements of the new 
industry. In the context of industry evolution, while scholars have documented existence of 
the incubation stage where firms make investments in exploring the new industry (Agarwal 
& Bayus, 2002; Golder, Shacham & Mitra, 2009), there is little work examining how firms 
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transform technological opportunities to economic value and further reconfigure their 
resources according to the requirements of an industry that has not been created yet. Further, 
although existing research has noted the existence of firms prior to their entry into a new 
industry and the differences in firms’ pre-entry capabilities (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; Helfat 
& Lieberman, 2002; Khessina & Carroll, 2008), researchers have largely abstracted away 
from examining firms’ strategies during the incubation stage of the industry. This is an 
important unaddressed gap, since firm-level investments undertaken in anticipation of 
creation of a new industry have important ramifications not only for firm, but also for 
industry and its innovation ecosystem’s evolution. Analysis of this critical period that may 
define subsequent firm’s evolution in the nascent industry, thus, deserves greater attention.  
The main focus of my dissertation is to contribute to a better understanding of firms’ 
entrepreneurial entry to nascent industries. While the existing literature has considered a 
firm’s product commercialization as the focal point of a firm’s entry into a nascent industry, 
the three essays of my dissertation highlight the new theoretical and empirical insights that 
could be gained by analysis of the technological investments that firms undertake prior to 
their product commercialization within a nascent industry context. Specifically, the theme of 
my dissertation is to address the following questions by accounting for firms’ technological 
investments in a nascent industry prior to product commercialization: What are the types of 
capabilities which enable entrepreneurial foray of firms to new industries? What are the 
breadth and depth of reconfiguration strategies that are undertaken in anticipation of creation 
of a nascent industry and a firm’s subsequent entry to that industry? What are the firm-level 
and industry-level consequences of firms’ investments in a nascent industry? 
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The empirical context of my dissertation is the agricultural biotechnology industry. 
Agricultural biotechnology is the use of modern biotechnology techniques to improve or 
modify plants with a particular focus on enhancing agricultural traits such as herbicide 
tolerance, pest resistance, and resistance to environmental stresses. Regulatory requirements 
in this industry require that firms seek permits from the USDA to conduct experiments with 
their transgenic crops outside the conditions of the laboratory. A firm’s application for these 
permits indicates that it has devoted resources to conduct technological experiments related 
to the agricultural biotechnology industry. This unique characteristic enables a systematic 
analysis of firms’ activities prior to product commercialization, and thus makes this industry 
an ideal context to study firm’s pre-commercialization efforts.  
Below, I elaborate on each of the essays. The first essay of my dissertation examines 
the incubation stage of industry evolution. While the classic industry evolution literature has 
provided important insights about evolution of industries (Agarwal & Gort, 1996; Gort & 
Klepper, 1982), a primary assumption in these models is that firm entry into an industry is 
analogous to its first instance of product commercialization (Agarwal, Echambadi & Sarkar, 
2002). Therefore, there has been less research attention devoted to studying the implications 
of firm activities that occur prior to product commercialization, or activities that do not result 
in product commercialization. To address this research gap, I focus on the technological 
investments that firms undertake prior to entry into an industry, and study the intertwined 
processes of firm-level economic value capture and industry-level ecosystem formation 
which underpin incubation of nascent industries.  
Within the context of the agricultural biotechnology industry, I document critical 
patterns related to firms’ technological investments. First, I show the investment life cycle 
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for the agricultural biotechnology industry indicating that initial investments by firms in the 
technological opportunities related to this industry precedes product commercialization by 18 
years. Second, I show that when firms’ investments in a technology is considered, the 
magnitude of investment life cycle is much larger than what is typically observed in the 
classic industry evolution life cycle based on product commercialization patterns. Not only 
are there many more investing firms relative to commercializing firms, but also heterogeneity 
in the type of investing firms increases. In particular, 85.5 percent of investing firms did not 
commercialized any product in the nascent industry, and while the population of investing 
firms comprised of startup firms, agriculture incumbents, and diversifying entrant from 
related industries such chemical, product commercialization was disproportionately pursued 
by diversifying entrants. These important patterns highlight the contrasting inferences that 
may be made about evolution of industries based on investment patterns during incubation 
stage as opposed to solely post-commercialization patterns. 
Furthermore, the substantial decline in the number and heterogeneity of 
commercializing firms relative to investing firms motivates a critical understudied aspect of 
incubation stage regarding the role and fate of the firms that do not engage in product 
commercialization. Do they represent failures?  Or, do these firms nonetheless capture value 
in modes other than commercialization, and also help define subsequent industry evolution 
and formation of ecosystems? At the firm level of analysis, I show that firms may capture 
economic value from their investments as they license their technologies to third parties or as 
they get acquired. This heterogeneity in mode of value capture may indeed stem from the 
heterogeneity in firm capabilities. At the industry level of analysis, I show that as firms 
captured economic value through modes other than product commercialization, their 
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capabilities were used and retained in the industry innovation ecosystem. In so doing, they 
contributed to the process of industry emergence via participation as support firms in the 
industry ecosystem.  
The second essay focuses on the capability antecedents of a firm’s entry into a 
nascent industry. In particular, it examines the pre-investment capabilities that impact the 
likelihood of a firm’s market entry into a nascent industry. The existing literature highlights a 
firm’s endowment of technical capabilities (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; Nerkar & Roberts, 
2004) and complementary assets (Gans & Stern, 2003; Teece, 1986) as critical factors 
determining a firm’s market entry into a nascent industry; however, these capability 
endowments are measured as the stock of a firm’s capabilities before its product 
commercialization. An understudied question is how a firm’s capability portfolio at the time 
of the initial technological investment in a nascent industry is related to its likelihood of 
entry. In order to address this question, I make a distinction between a firm’s pre-investment 
and pre-entry capabilities  i.e., a firm’s capability portfolio prior to its initial technological 
investment in the nascent industry and prior to its market entry, respectively.   
Using the empirical context of agricultural biotechnology, the findings of this essay 
corroborate the well-established relationship that a firm’s pre-entry stock of technical 
capabilities and complementary assets is related to the likelihood of entry into a nascent 
industry. However, it extends the existing literature by providing evidence that a firm’s 
reconfiguration experiences prior to initial technological investment are the key pre-
investment factors that are related to the likelihood of entry into a nascent industry. Prior 
reconfiguration experiences – i.e., a firm’s experiences in modifying its capability portfolio 
prior to its investment in the focal industry – enable a firm’s efforts in gaining access to the 
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technical capabilities and complementary assets that have been suggested as crucial pre-entry 
capabilities. When the pre-investment reconfiguration experiences and the pre-entry stock of 
capabilities are considered jointly, a firm’s pre-entry stock of technical capabilities and 
complementary assets is the dominant explaining factor of entry into a nascent industry; thus, 
it implies that pre-investment reconfiguration experiences affect the likelihood of entry via 
their influence on pre-entry technical capabilities and complementary assets. By explicitly 
theorizing a mediation model, I emphasize the endogeneity of capability development 
process and the role of deliberate reconfiguration efforts, rather than passive leveraging of 
existing resource endowments. 
This essay contributes to the literature by providing novel insights about capability 
antecedents of a firm’s entry into a nascent industry. I join the two literatures of industry 
evolution and firm evolution. In doing so, I draw attention to the endogenous sources of 
heterogeneity in pre-entry capabilities across firms. My hypotheses build on the literature 
regarding the role of a firm’s pre-entry capabilities and extend it by accounting for the 
capability reconfiguration efforts that are undertaken by firms in anticipation of entry into a 
nascent industry. Rather than presuming firm’s pre-entry capabilities as exogenous factors 
that are leveraged to the new industry context, I emphasize that pre-entry capabilities are 
indeed developed during incubation period.  
In the third essay, I elaborate on the reconfiguration strategies that firms undertake in 
anticipation of entry into nascent industries. In particular, I focus on the extent to which 
incumbents of the obsolescing industry, de novo startups and diversifying firms differ in 
terms of the content, sequence and sources of capability reconfiguration strategies.  
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The propositions of this theory essay draw on the assumption that the objective of a 
firm’s capability reconfiguration strategies is to narrow the capability gap that exists between 
its initial capabilities and the required configuration of technical capabilities and specialized 
complementary assets in a nascent industry. I suggest that capability reconfiguration efforts 
of firms take the two forms of capability extension and capability deepening (Karim & 
Mitchell, 2000). Due to the differential historical antecedents, incumbents of the obsolescing 
industry, de novo startups and diversifying firms differ in whether they pursue capability 
extension or capability deepening. Specifically, incumbents are more likely to engage in 
capability extension for achieving the required portfolio of technical capabilities, while 
startups and diversifying firms are more likely to engage in capability deepening for 
achieving the required portfolio of technical capabilities. For obtaining specialized 
complementary assets, incumbents are more likely to engage in capability deepening, while 
startups and diversifying firms are more likely to engage in capability extension.  
In terms of the sequence of reconfiguration strategies, incumbents are likely to pursue 
extension of technical capabilities prior to deepening of specialized complementary assets.  
Diversifying entrants are likely to pursue deepening of technical capabilities concurrent with 
extension of specialized complementary assets. De novo entrants are likely to pursue 
deepening of technical capabilities prior to extension of specialized complementary assets. 
Similarly, these three types of firms differ in the extent to which they draw on internal versus 
external sources of capabilities.  
This essay contributes to the strategic management literature by suggesting that 
although firms may be similar in the content of their capability reconfiguration strategies and 
their focus on achieving a similar configuration of capabilities, they are likely to pursue 
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divergent processes in terms of the sequence of reconfiguration efforts and sources of 
capabilities. Specifically, while firms undertake different sequence of activities or draw on 
different sources of capabilities, they were all focused on attaining a similar configuration of 
technical capabilities and specialized complementary assets. 
Together, the three essays shed light on an understudied phenomenon –incubation of 
an industry, with a focus on heterogeneity among firms, and their strategic reconfiguration 
efforts. Contrary to prior literature that has focused on stocks of endowments, my dissertation 
shows that firms actively engage in entrepreneurial reconfiguration of capabilities, and in 




CHAPTER 2: ESSAY 1 
MODES OF VALUE CAPTURE IN ECOSYSTEMS OF NASCENT INDUSTRIES: 
EVIDENCE FROM AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY1 
 
The birth of new industries, due to entry of entrepreneurial firms and introduction of 
technology breakthroughs, has long been associated with creative destruction (Schumpeter, 
1942). Industry evolution scholars typically study firm strategy and industry structure after 
commercialization of the first product2 within the new industry (Agarwal, Sarkar & 
Echambadi, 2002; Gort & Klepper, 1982); hence, existing literature has provided important 
insights about the patterns of firm entry and exit in an industry (Gort & Klepper, 1982; 
Utterback & Suárez, 1993), the competitive dynamics between industry incumbents and new 
entrants (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tripsas, 1997; Tushman & Anderson, 1986), and 
heterogeneity in firms’ performance within new industries (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; Helfat 
& Lieberman, 2002; Klepper & Simons, 2000) in the post-commercialization era. Left 
understudied, though, is the dynamics of evolution of firm and industry prior to the first 
instance of product commercialization. 
Long before the first product is commercialized in the market, firms make 
investments in the technological opportunities related to a nascent industry. These firm-level 
investments in anticipation of creation of a new industry result in an industry-level 
incubation period, which we define as the period between the introduction of a discontinuous 
technological change and the first instance of product commercialization. This critical period 
                                                 
1  This chapter is co-authored with Dr. Rajshree Agarwal.  
2  The use of the term ‘product commercialization’ in this essay also includes ‘introduction of a new 
service’ within the context of service industries.  
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may influence subsequent evolution of the nascent industry, but has largely been 
understudied. In particular, due to the focus on product commercialization as the focal point 
of a firm’s entry to a nascent industry, most studies have abstracted away from analysis of a 
firm’s technological investments prior to the instance of product commercialization as well 
as alternative modes of economic value capture within nascent industries. 
The objective of this essay is to elaborate on the critical processes that underpin 
incubation of a nascent industry. We focus on the incubation period of the agricultural 
biotechnology industry and study the firm-level and industry-level consequences of 
technological investments that are undertaken by firms during this period. At the firm-level 
of analysis, we examine the alternative modes of value capture from investments in 
technological opportunities during the incubation period and link the heterogeneity in the 
type of investing firms to their mode of value capture. At the industry-level of analysis, we 
discuss the implications of firms’ value capture through alternative modes for development 
of innovation ecosystems and the eventual incubation of a nascent industry. Analysis of firm-
level and industry-level outcomes of firms’ technological investments thus provides a holistic 
view of incubation of nascent industries. 
We rely on rich data that look at the population of firms that were involved in 
research experiments related to agricultural biotechnology during 1980-2010. Agricultural 
biotechnology is the use of modern biotechnology techniques to improve or modify plants 
with a particular focus on enhancing agricultural traits such as herbicide tolerance, pest 
resistance, and resistance to environmental stresses. The agricultural biotechnology is an 
appropriate context to examine these questions for a number of reasons. Because of the 
regulatory requirements in this industry, firms are required to seek permits from the USDA to 
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conduct experiments with their transgenic crops outside the conditions of the laboratory. This 
unique characteristic enables a systematic analysis of firms’ activities prior to their product 
commercialization and during the incubation period.  
The detailed analysis of incubation of agricultural biotechnology leads to 
identification of critical patterns regarding incubation of nascent industries. First, we 
document the duration and patterns of firm activity during incubation period of this industry. 
These findings show that the incubation period lasted for 18 years, and that technological 
investments occurred at a larger scale (6.8 times) compared to product commercialization. 
Second, at the firm level of analysis, we show that firms may capture economic value from 
their investments as they license their technologies to third parties or as they get acquired. 
This heterogeneity in mode of value capture may indeed stem from the heterogeneity in firm 
capabilities. Third, at the industry level of analysis, we show that as firms captured economic 
value through modes other than product commercialization, their capabilities were used and 
retained in the industry innovation ecosystem. Thus, they contributed to the process of 
industry emergence via participation in the industry ecosystem. 
These findings provide novel insights to the research literatures in entrepreneurship, 
industry evolution and strategic management in a number of ways. First, to the industry 
evolution literature, we highlight the importance of the incubation period. Because the classic 
industry evolution marks the inception of a new industry as the time of first product 
commercialization within the nascent industry, firms’ technological investments during the 
incubation period is systematically excluded from these studies, and this essay underscores 
the importance of firms’ activities during the incubation period for a better understanding of 
factors underpinning subsequent evolution of industries. Second, by examining alternative 
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modes of value capture, we reconcile literature in entrepreneurship that treats acquisitions as 
successful exits with literature in industry evolution that treats lack of product 
commercialization as failure, and show that even if an entrepreneurial firm may no longer 
exist, value creation may continue and value capture might have already occurred. Third, we 
contribute to innovation and entrepreneurship literature by elaborating on how nascent 
industries are created when firms capture economic value through modes other than product 
commercialization, and in turn contribute to the development of an innovation ecosystem.  
This essay proceeds as follows. We begin with a brief review of the literature 
regarding evolution of new industries and propose a model for incubation of nascent 
industries. This review is followed by a detailed description of the industry context of this 
essay: agricultural biotechnology. In doing so, we discuss the implications of the advent of 
agricultural biotechnology for firm-level economic value capture and industry-level 
ecosystem development.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Literature Review: Evolution of Nascent Industries 
An extensive body of research literature in evolutionary economics (Gort & Klepper, 
1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982), organizational ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) and 
technology management (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Tushman & Anderson, 1986) has 
focused on studying evolution of industries. Two focal aspects of the evolutionary 
trajectories of industries in these literature streams relate to the patterns of firm entry and exit 
and the demography of industry entrants (Agarwal & Tripsas, 2008). Models of industry life 
cycle typically examine patterns of firm entry and exit within an industry subsequent to the 
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first instance of product commercialization (Agarwal, Sarkar & Echambadi, 2002). The 
generic industry life cycle model illustrates an early period of small number of firms, 
followed by a rapid increase in firms during the growth stage, a sharp exit during the 
shakeout stage and an eventual mature stage characterized by a stable number of firms with 
low levels of entry and exit (Gort & Klepper, 1982). Discontinuous transformations and 
technological shocks may render the industry obsolete, and the new industry born from such 
radical innovations follows similar patterns as well (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). These 
empirical regularities have been consistently documented across a variety of industry 
contexts. 
The literature has also highlighted the heterogeneity in the demography of firms: de 
novo startups, diversifying firms from related industries and industry incumbents from the 
obsolescing industry vie for success after they enter the focal industry context (Helfat & 
Lieberman, 2002). The rates of entry and the relative advantage of these firms differ across 
industries and over time. In particular, there is variance across industries regarding what 
types of firms enter early and/or subsequently dominate the industry. For example, Internet-
related industries in the mid-1990s (Goldfarb, Kirsch & Miller, 2007) or the personal 
computer industry (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007) primarily arose due to entry of de novo firms, 
whereas industries such as automobiles (Carroll, Bigelow, Siedel & Tsai, 1996) and 
television receivers (Klepper & Simons, 2000) represented early entry by diversifying firms. 
Still other industries, such as telecommunications (Chen, Williams & Agarwal, 2012), 
represented an even mix of de novo, diversifying, and incumbent firms. 
Different explanations have been suggested for the observed patterns in the evolution 
of industries. While scholars of evolutionary economics focus on the information sources and 
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the accumulated stock of knowledge as key factors determining firm entry into new 
industries (Gort & Klepper, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982), the focus of organizational 
ecology literature has been predominantly on the density of firms within an industry and its 
implications for forces of legitimization and resource scarcity (Carroll & Hannan, 1989; 
Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Moreover, technology management perspective attributes 
patterns of industry evolution to the underlying technological changes so that firm entry and 
exit are often influenced by the technology cycles (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Tushman 
& Anderson, 1986).  
Although these streams of literature have provided important empirical and 
theoretical advances regarding the evolution of industries, a relatively unaddressed research 
area relates to the incubation period of an industry. A primary assumption in these models is 
that firm entry into an industry is analogous to its product commercialization. Accordingly, 
models of industry life cycle typically mark the inception of an industry as the first instance 
of product commercialization within that industry. Therefore, activities that occur prior to the 
first instance of product commercialization at the industry-level have been largely 
understudied. Although the existence of the incubation period has been documented in a 
handful of studies (Agarwal & Bayus, 2002; Golder, Shacham & Mitra, 2009), there has been 
less scholarly attention devoted to study heterogeneity in investing firms in a new technology 
and its implications for competitive dynamics of an evolving industry (Forbes & Kirsch, 
2011). This is an important gap, since activities undertaken by firms prior to 
commercialization may have defining implications for subsequent evolution of the industry, 
and the relative advantage across heterogeneous firms.  
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Another implication of considering a firm’s first instance of product 
commercialization as the point of firm entry into an industry is that these models typically do 
not account for the firm-level activities that occur prior to the first instance of product 
commercialization or firm-level activities that do not lead to product commercialization. 
Firms may initiate their technological investments in exploring the new industry and 
transforming entrepreneurial opportunities into commercially valuable products well before 
their market entry into an industry. These technological investments by entrepreneurial firms 
may result in product commercialization, in which case the commercial activities of these 
firms inform the functional models of industry evolution (Agarwal & Gort, 1996; Gort & 
Klepper, 1982). However, if the technological investments by these firms do not lead to 
product commercialization within the focal industry context, these firms are typically 
excluded from models of the classic industry evolution literature. Thus, the role and fate of 
these excluded firms are left unstudied.  Do they merely represent failed experiments?  Or, do 
these firms nonetheless capture value in modes other than commercialization, and also help 
define subsequent industry evolution and formation of ecosystems? Addressing these 
questions is important from both industry and firm perspectives.  
Incubation of Nascent Industries: A Proposed Model 
In studying the incubation of nascent industries, we abstract away from the key 
assumption in the industry evolution literature that a firm’s point of entry into a nascent 
industry is the time of the first product commercialization, and instead focus on the firms’ 
pre-commercialization technological investments in a nascent industry. Figure 1-1 illustrates 
the building blocks of a model that describes some of the processes underpinning the 
incubation of nascent industries. In our model, introduction of a technological change 
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triggers firms to make technological investments that represent efforts in transforming 
technological opportunities in a nascent industry to a product with commercial value. The 
inception of the industry occurs when at least one firm’s technological investment results in 
product commercialization.  
[Figure 1-1 about here] 
The investing firms are, however, heterogeneous in terms of their backgrounds. 
Conforming to the industry evolution literature, the three types of firms that may invest in a 
new industry are de novo firms, diversifying firms and industry incumbents of the prior 
industry regime. The firm-level heterogeneity across investing firms implies that firms may 
differ in terms of their capability endowments (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002; Klepper & 
Simons, 2000; Mitchell, 1989), incentives (Arrow, 1962; Henderson, 1993), and cognition of 
the technological landscape (Benner & Tripsas, 2012; Kaplan, 2008). Not only do these 
sources of heterogeneity indicate differences in the initial position of firms, but they also 
suggest different paths pursued by firms in anticipation of entry into a nascent industry. Thus, 
it is likely that different types of firms achieve different outcomes following their 
technological investment. 
 Given that introduction of a commercial product indicates a firm’s entry into an 
industry as well as the inception of the new industry, one outcome of interest for investing 
firms is product commercialization. Firms that engage in commercialization constitute the 
core firms within an industry, and capture economic value from selling products. However, 
even though a firm’s initial technological investment in a nascent industry may indicate that 
its managers perceive a strategic fit between a firm’s characteristics and the requirements of 
the nascent industry, it is likely that they pursue modes of value capture other than product 
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commercialization. These alternative modes include licensing of technologies or exiting 
through acquisition. In doing so, they too play a critical role in the incubation of nascent 
industries.  Finally, firms may terminate technological investment prior to realization of any 
of the above modes of value capture, and thus may be considered failures because of their 
inability to capture any direct economic value. 
We link heterogeneity in the types of investing firms to the firm-level consequences 
of technological investment by examining modes of economic value capture and the 
industry-level consequences of technological investment by examining development of 
ecosystems within an industry. Firm-level value capture occurs as firms engage in product 
commercialization, licensing of their technologies or exit through acquisition. Therefore, 
even though some firms may not commercialize a product, they may still capture economic 
value through these alternative modes. These modes of value capture have a one-to-one 
correspondence with a firm’s role within the innovation ecosystem of an industry. Firms that 
engage in product commercialization are the core firms in the ecosystem, whereas firms that 
engage in alternative modes of value capture serve as support roles in the ecosystem 
providing complementary capabilities to the commercializing firms. Moreover, firms that 
terminate their technological investment may provide knowledge spillovers that are 
beneficial to other investing firms. 
The two intertwined processes of economic value capture at the firm-level and 
ecosystem development at the industry-level underpin the incubation of a nascent industry. 
The heterogeneity in these outcomes is driven by the heterogeneity in the types of investing 
firms. Different investing firms may leverage heterogeneous bundles of capabilities to the 
new industry. As some of the investing firms configure the required capability portfolio for 
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product commercialization, capabilities available in the ecosystem enable their technology 
sourcing. Thus, the capabilities provided by non-commercializing firms become crucial for 
product commercialization by other firms. Further, the prospect of value capture through 
alternative modes provides adequate incentives for firms to initiate technological 
investments. Drawing on this model, we next discuss the incubation of agricultural 
biotechnology industry. 
INDUSTRY CONTEXT: AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Agricultural biotechnology is the use of modern biotechnology techniques such as 
molecular biology to improve or modify the characteristics of plants and achieve enhanced 
agricultural traits such as herbicide tolerance, pest resistance, and resistance to environmental 
stresses3. The revenue potential of genetic modification in the agriculture industry arises due 
to increased agricultural productivity and reduction in farming costs. Thus, famers are willing 
to pay a price premium for a transgenic seed with a potential to reduce their costs and 
enhance agricultural productivity. For instance, farmers may apply less pesticide on a pest-
resistant transgenic crop because the external protein that has been genetically embedded 
within the crop is itself harmful to pests and may replicate the function of pesticides.  
                                                 
3  The science of plant biotechnology, i.e., genetic modification of plants, has applications broader 
than enhanced agricultural productivity traits. Genetic modification of plants may be of interest to the 
food industry (foods with enhanced nutritional characteristics or better flavor or appearance), to the 
pharmaceutical industry (plant-based drugs), to the energy industry (crops for bio-based fuel 
production) and to the bioremediation industry. Although all of these applications rely on the general 
science of plant biotechnology, the commercial industry with which they are associated are distinct 
from each other. This essay only focuses on the implications of plant biotechnology sciences for crop 
production and agricultural productivity.  
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Incubation and Evolution of Agricultural Biotechnology 
The agricultural biotechnology industry builds on the applications of technological 
advancements in modern biotechnology for plant sciences. The first viability of genetic 
modification of plants was shown in 1977 when a research group at the University of Ghent 
in Belgium identified a gene transfer technique using Agrobacterium tumefaciens. This was 
followed by another major technological event in 1983 when three independent research 
groups, from Washington University in St. Louis, University of Ghent, and Monsanto, 
respectively, presented their research findings on the first transgenic plants – i.e., antibiotic 
resistant tobacco and petunias. In the aftermath of these technological achievements, firms 
with diverse capabilities made technological investments in the new technology and 
experimented with transforming this technological opportunity to a product with commercial 
value. The incubation period continued through 1995, at which time the first commercial 
product in the agricultural biotechnology  herbicide-tolerant cotton  was introduced, 
followed by introduction of herbicide-tolerant soybeans and pest-resistant cotton. Table 1-1 
provides a timeline of notable events during the incubation stage and further evolution of the 
agricultural biotechnology industry. 
[Table 1-1 about here] 
The fact that it took 18 years since the technological breakthrough in 1977 until the 
first instance of product commercialization and inception of this industry in 1995 highlights 
that new industries are not automatically created based on a single technological event. 
Rather, entrepreneurial actions of firms and individuals are required for a technology with a 
potential economic value to be transformed into an innovative output and create a nascent 
industry. Further empirical evidence is consistent with this observation. Across 30 new 
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industries studied by Agarwal and Bayus (2002), the incubation period lasted on average 
about 28 years.4 In addition, Golder, Shacham and Mitra (2009) have documented the 
average duration of the incubation period across 29 radical innovations as 26 years.5 Similar 
accounts of incubation of new industries have been recorded for the VCR industry 
(Rosenbloom & Cusumano, 1987), cochlear implants industry (Garud & Rappa, 1994) and 
wireless communication industry (Levinthal, 1998). Even for a fully developed product, 
accounts of 32 consumer durable product markets indicate an average time period of eight 
years before the product is commercialized on the market (Kohli, Lehmann & Pae, 1999). 
Overall, these trends suggest the importance of close examination of firm activities during 
the incubation period.  
Shifting Landscape in the Conventional Agriculture Industry 
The advent of the agricultural biotechnology was a major technological shock to the 
conventional agriculture industry. Historically, conventional agriculture firms used plant 
breeding techniques, including hybridization, to develop elite varieties of crops. 
Conventional plant breeders select superior varieties based on characteristics such as faster 
growth, higher yields, better taste, improved pest and disease resistance, and better fit to the 
agro-climatic condition of each geographic region. The selected varieties are then cross-bred 
to create new and improved varieties of crops. This process is repeated over years to obtain a 
good line of crop. Conventional agriculture firms derived economic value from selling these 
                                                 
4 This information is calculated by the authors based on Table 2 of Agarwal & Bayus (2002). We 
consider the incubation period as the time period between the first invention year until the first 
commercialization year. 
5 The authors calculated this information based on Table 6 of the Golder et al. (2009), and consider 




elite varieties of crops to farmers. However, introduction of modern biotechnology 
techniques transformed the underlying capabilities for operation in the crop production 
industry extensively. The major change was that agricultural biotechnology enabled 
achieving improved varieties that were not possible through breeding of the same or very 
closely related varieties. For instance, new external genes from other organisms may be 
inserted into a plant. Alternately, plants may be modified by removing or switching off their 
existing genes. Further, modern biotechnology techniques such as marker-assisted breeding 
have made major changes in conventional plant breeding by accelerating the selection 
process.  
From the farmers’ perspectives, the introduction of transgenic crop varieties in 
addition to conventional varieties has changed the face of the U.S. agriculture industry. In 
2011, 69 million hectares of transgenic crops were planted in the United States. The USDA 
estimates the adoption rate for major transgenic crops in the United States as 91 percent for 
soybean, 88 percent for cotton, 85 percent for corn, 95 percent for sugar beet, and 85 percent 
for canola (James, 2011). Figure 1-2 shows the percentage of land cultivated by transgenic 
crops in the United States in each year, which conforms to the sales take-off patterns depicted 
in industry evolution studies (Agarwal & Bayus, 2002).  
[Figure 1-2 about here] 
For the incumbent agriculture firms, technological advancement in agricultural 
biotechnology was considered a major technological change. Their familiarity with plant 
breeding capabilities was no longer the key capability for operation in the industry. 
Nonetheless, the stock of accumulated knowledge and intellectual property embodied in the 
conventional varieties (i.e., germplasm) offered by conventional agriculture firms retained 
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value as complementary assets to genetic modification moving forward. Hence, not only was 
the conventional crop varieties displaced by the transgenic varieties at the product market 
level, but also conventional agriculture firms’ model of business operation was displaced 
with the model according to the requirements of biotechnology regime.  
Entrepreneurial Entry into Agricultural Biotechnology 
The technological opportunities related to agricultural biotechnology invited firms 
from diverse backgrounds to invest in the new technology and explore ways to transform the 
technological opportunity to commercial value. Figure 1-3 shows the technological 
investment and product commercialization patterns related to agricultural biotechnology. The 
gray bars show the number of firms that are involved in technological investments related to 
agricultural biotechnology at each year; and the black bars show the number of firms that 
commercialized a product within the agricultural biotechnology industry. 
[Figure 1-3 about here] 
In our research design, firms are assumed to be involved in technological investment 
in agricultural biotechnology if they applied for permits to conduct experiments with their 
transgenic crops outside the conditions of laboratory. Firms are required to seek release 
permits from APHIS (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services) within the USDA for 
these experiments (§7 CFR 340), based on which a comprehensive list of investing firms in 
agricultural biotechnology can be compiled. A firm’s application for these permits indicates 
that it has devoted resources to conduct technological experiments related to the agricultural 
biotechnology industry. In order to analyze firms’ technological investments in agricultural 
biotechnology, we focus on private firms’ experiments in product categories corresponding 
to SIC industry groups of 011 and 013 within the major group of agricultural production 
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crops, which include corn, cotton, potatoes, soybeans, squash, sugar beets, canola, and 
alfalfa. Although application for a release permit indicates a firm’s involvements in 
experiments with transgenic crops and provides a consistent proxy to create the sample of 
investing firms, the actual investment in agricultural biotechnology may have started before 
the application date for a release permit. Using firm’s SEC filings, annual reports and 
LexisNexis press releases, we identify the first mention of a firm’s involvement in 
agricultural biotechnology in the form of establishing a new research division, engaging in 
research and development alliances, or acquiring relevant businesses. The final list of 
investing firms includes 69 firms that were involved in experimental field trials in the U.S. 
agricultural biotechnology during 1980-2010.  
 In order to compile the list of commercialized agricultural biotechnology traits, we 
track all the genetic transformation events that have been cleared for commercial release 
based on the federal government regulatory requirements (§7 CFR 340) overseen by USDA 
and EPA. Approval of a petition for non-regulated status indicates that a particular genetic 
transformation could be legally commercialized in the United States. We further confirm the 
instance of commercialization using the firm’s SEC filings, annual reports, company 
websites and LexisNexis. The commercialization data show that 14 firms have been involved 
in selling agricultural biotechnology traits to farmers or in licensing these traits to seed 
distributors. Ten of these firms have commercialized products based on their own 
technological investments in the agricultural biotechnology, and four firms have 




Comparison of technological investment and product commercialization patterns in 
Figure 1-3 shows that both charts seem to conform to the classic depiction of firm entry and 
exit over the industry life cycle (Gort & Klepper, 1982; Utterback & Suárez, 1993); however, 
the magnitude of the two charts show that more firms entered the industry as measured by 
technological investments in agricultural biotechnology, rather than as measured by 
commercialization of agricultural biotechnology traits. Indeed, only 14.5 percent of investing 
firms eventually commercialized a product. Such a substantial difference in the number of 
firms that made technological investments versus commercialized products forms an 
empirical puzzle regarding the fate of 85.5 percent of firms that invested resources toward the 
technology, but had no product commercialization. Does lack of product commercialization 
indicate that these firms were unable to capture economic value from their investments, and 
that they should be deemed failures? Or, did they capture value, and continue to be active 
even though they did not commercialize a product? What were the consequences of their lack 
of product commercialization for the industry incubation?   
Although current literature has reported the survival rate of industry entrants after 
their product commercialization (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; Carroll et al., 1996; Klepper & 
Simons, 2000; Mitchell, 1991), there has been less focus on the market entry rate of investing 
firms  an exception is the study of automobile industry by Carroll & Hannan (2000) in 
which 11% of pre-producers have commercialized their products. This is despite the budding 
research interest in studying the pre-production activity of firms (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; 
Carroll & Khessina, 2005; Jovanovic, 2004; Lomi, Larsen & Wezel, 2010) or their 
technological entry – as opposed to market entry – to a field (Malerba & Orsenigo, 1999).  
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Heterogeneity in Investing Firms Types 
Another observation regarding the incubation period is the heterogeneity in the type 
of investing firms compared to commercializing firms. The three types of firms that 
conducted investment in agricultural biotechnology included de novo startups, incumbent 
agriculture firms, and diversifying firms from related industries, particularly chemical. In our 
data coding, firms are considered de novo entrants or startups if the firm was not in existence 
prior to its first investment in the agricultural biotechnology industry; agriculture incumbents 
if the firm was previously engaged in conventional agriculture businesses that used plant 
breeding and hybridization with the standard industry classification (SIC) code 01; and 
diversifying entrants if the firm had prior experience in related pharmaceutical (SIC 283) or 
agricultural chemical (SIC 287) industries.  
Among 69 investing firms, 18 firms (26 percent) are agricultural biotechnology 
startup, 33 firms (48 percent) are conventional agriculture incumbents, and 18 firms (26 
percent) are diversifying entrants from the chemical industry. The importance of the 
heterogeneity in the type of investing firms becomes salient when we look at the same 
distribution for firms with a commercialized product. Among 10 firms with a 
commercialized product, 1 firm (10 percent) is agricultural biotechnology startup, 2 firms (20 
percent) are conventional agriculture incumbents, and 7 firms (70 percent) are diversifying 
entrants. Not only is the investing firms population much larger in number, but also investing 
firms are more diverse in terms of their background. 
The type of firms that comprise a nascent industry and the conditions under which a 
particular type of firm tend to arise are important understudied questions for understanding 
incubation of nascent industries (Forbes & Kirsch, 2011). Inferences about the composition 
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of firms in an industry are typically made using the population of firms with commercialized 
products within that industry. Records of product commercialization suggest that the 
agricultural biotechnology industry is predominantly composed of diversifying entrants with 
chemical background. Analysis of firms’ technological investments, though, provides a 
different picture. While diversifying entrants comprise 70 percent of commercializing firms, 
they are only 26 percent of investing firms. More importantly, all three types of firms are 
engaged in technological investments in roughly equal numbers. Thus, the composition of 
this industry based on product commercialization may seem more homogenous relative to the 
composition of industry based on technology investments.  
This is a particularly important issue when viewed in the light of modes of value 
capture within a nascent industry. If there are systematic differences between firms that may 
lead to product commercialization by only one firm type, it is imperative to understand those. 
Therefore, focusing on investing firms as opposed to solely commercializing firms would 
address an understudied research issue as it relates to firm-level economic value capture and 
industry-level ecosystem development. The next two sections examine the systematic 
differences across the three types of investing firms in a nascent industry  i.e., de novo 
entrants, diversifying entrants and prior technology regime incumbents  in terms of mode of 
economic value capture and the consequences for incubation of industries. 
HETEROGENEITY OF FIRMS AND MODE OF VALUE CAPTURE 
In this section, we elaborate on the firm-level consequences of technological 
investments in a nascent industry. Although product commercialization has been emphasized 
as the chief mode of economic value capture within the industry evolution literature, a 
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parallel literature in technology entrepreneurship has identified alternative modes of value 
capture such as participation in the market for technology (Arora, Fosfuri & Gambardella, 
2001; Gans & Stern, 2003). Investing firms may possess technologies or capabilities that are 
of interest to other firms. Even if a firm does not commercialize a product and does not 
capture economic value through direct sales of products to customers, its capabilities may be 
a source of economic value in two ways: the first mode is technology licensing so that 
another firm gets access to the intellectual property rights associated with a technology in 
exchange for an agreed form of payment. The second mode operates through acquisitions of 
firms so that the acquiring firms get access to a firm’s intellectual properties and benefit from 
its capabilities. 
Alternative Modes of Value Capture 
We explore the extent to which firms engage in alternative modes of value capture by 
tracking their histories through various sources. Investing firms are considered to capture 
value through acquisition if their whole firm or their agricultural biotechnology unit is 
acquired by a third party, and it is indicated in the acquisition deal that the agricultural 
biotechnology capabilities of a acquired firm was of the acquiring firm’s interest. Investing 
firms are considered to capture value through a licensing agreement if they have formed a 
non-equity or equity-based alliance for exchange or licensing of their agricultural 
biotechnology intellectual property or knowledge. Investing firms are considered to have 
terminated investment if they experienced bankruptcy or ceased all their agricultural 
biotechnology activity prior to any form of the above-mentioned value capture. 
Among 69 investing firms, 10 firms (14.5 percent) have commercialized a product, 
22 firms (32 percent) were acquired, 6 firms (8.7 percent) were involved in technology 
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licensing as their primary mode of value capture, 17 firms (24.5 percent) terminated their 
investments in agricultural biotechnology, and 14 firms (20.3 percent) are active investing 
firms as in 2011. Since technology licensing is not mutually exclusive from the other modes 
of value capture, we make a distinction between firms whose primary mode of value capture 
was technology licensing (six firms as mentioned above), those with technology licensing in 
parallel to product commercialization, and those with technology licensing prior to being 
acquired. These results suggest that a success rate of 14.5 percent based on 
commercialization outcomes becomes a 55.2 percent success rate given alternative modes of 
value capture.  
In order to address the question regarding the potential systematic differences across 
firms that engaged in different modes of value capture, we link firm types to their mode of 
value capture. Table 1-2 shows the summary statistics of heterogeneity in mode of value 
capture based on firm type. Summary statistics in table 1-2 show that diversifying firms are 
present in larger numbers among firms that have commercialized a product. Moreover, 
startups and incumbents are present in larger numbers among acquired firms. Startups are 
also active in technology licensing. 
[Table 1-2 about here] 
In order to further explore the relationship between heterogeneity in firm type and 
mode of value capture, we use a competing risk event history model (Fine & Gray, 1999) to 
estimate the sub-hazard ratio that a firm engages in different modes of value capture such as 
product commercialization and getting acquired. We use the competing risk estimation 
technique because it accounts for the possibility of termination of a firm’s investment in 
agricultural biotechnology and for right censorship in the data. Due to the small number of 
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firms with technology licensing as their primary mode of value capture, we do not include 
technology licensing as a competing event in the estimation model. Moreover, technology 
licensing does not eliminate a firm from the risk set of experiencing other modes of value 
capture and thus it is incompatible with the econometric assumptions of a competing risk 
event history model. Table 1-3 shows the empirical results. Model 1 shows that hazard of 
product commercialization for diversifying entrants is greater relative to startups, whereas the 
hazard of product commercialization for agriculture incumbents is not statistically different 
from startups and diversifying entrants. Model 2 shows that the hazard of getting acquired for 
both startups and agriculture incumbents is greater relative to diversifying entrants; however, 
the hazard of getting acquired for startups is not statistically different from agriculture 
incumbents. Model 3 shows that the hazard of ceasing investment is greater for diversifying 
entrants relative to both startups and agriculture incumbents; however, the hazard of 
investment termination is not statistically different between startups and agriculture 
incumbents. 
[Table 1-3 about here] 
The models in Table 1-3 also account for alternative mechanisms suggested in the 
industry ecology and early mover (dis)advantage literatures. The density of firms at each year 
may influence firm performance in a nascent industry (Carroll & Hannan, 1989) because 
density of firms may shape forces related to industry legitimization from both supply and 
demand sides. Alternatively, it may influence the level of competition over industry 
resources. Table 1-3 includes the linear and quadratic terms for the number of investing firms 
at the year of the focal firm’s investment in agricultural biotechnology. Empirical results 
show that they do not have a statistically significant relationship with sub-hazard ratio of any 
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of the events. With regard to the timing of entry (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), we 
include the year of investment in the model. Earlier investment in agricultural biotechnology 
increases the hazard of getting acquired for the firm. Accordingly, the relation between firm 
type and mode of value capture is above and beyond the explanations of early mover 
advantage and organizational ecology. 
These empirical findings show how heterogeneity in mode of value capture is related 
to firm type. Specifically, diversifying firms are more likely to commercialize products, 
while conventional agriculture firms and startups are more likely to get acquired.  
Diversifying Entrants and Product Commercialization 
Product commercialization within a new industry is the dominant mode of economic 
value capture according to the industry evolution literature. The empirical results show that 
diversifying entrants are more likely to commercialize a product within the context of 
agricultural biotechnology. Within the context of agricultural biotechnology, diversifying 
firms mainly entered from related industries such as chemical industry. While they lacked 
plant breeding capabilities prior to their investments, many of them were engaged in 
production of agriculture-related products such as pesticides and herbicides. Additionally, 
key motivating factors led to their investment in agricultural biotechnology as a potential 
high value-added business, given some demand and supply related disruptions in their focal 
industry. Chemical companies, for instance, experienced a substantial increase in prices of 
oil, an important input for their operations, following the first and second oil shock in 1973 
and 1979. Also, chemistry knowledge had been stagnant since the 1960s and thus chemical 
firms were looking for a valuable diversification strategy (Chandler, 2005; Lieberman, 1990). 
Finally, chemical companies had related capabilities in plant sciences due to their 
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involvement in agricultural chemical production. These general plant sciences capability and 
agricultural chemical production imply that managers benefited from the right information 
corridor to recognize the opportunities related to agricultural biotechnology. 
Although a thorough examination of the factors that lead to product 
commercialization is beyond the scope of this essay, a preliminary comparison across the 
three types of investing firms suggest that diversifying firms’ capability portfolios enabled 
their product commercialization. Each type of firm had capabilities that were relevant to 
agricultural biotechnology, and thus created value. However, the different types of firms also 
represent different bundles of capabilities within the firm boundary, and thus have 
implications for the type of value that they could capture. Incumbent firm advantage is 
typically related to the complementary assets that may continue to retain value (Mitchell, 
1989; Rothaermel, 2001; Tripsas, 1997), since the discontinuous technology often renders 
their core technological capabilities obsolete. To the extent that these firms face 
organizational inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) and lack 
transformational experience (King & Tucci, 2002), they have a limited ability to reconfigure 
the capabilities required for product commercialization, and thus are less likely to 
commercialize a product. Startups have core technical capabilities that are relevant to the 
nascent industry, but lack the necessary complementary assets. Moreover, product 
commercialization in nascent industries typically requires significant investments in 
reconfiguration of firm capabilities, and startups have neither the scale nor the experience 
necessary to undertake this task. Thus, similar to incumbents, these firms are less likely to 
commercialize a product. 
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On the other hand, diversifying firms are more likely to be a composite bundle of 
related technological capabilities, complementary assets and reconfiguration experience. For 
instance, diversifying firms in the context of agricultural biotechnology came from 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries, and thus they could draw on the related 
technological capabilities and R&D expertise. Most important, they benefitted from prior 
reconfiguration experiences because most of the diversifying firms were in multiple industry 
value chains, and had past experiences in both alliance and acquisition management. Since 
all three of these capabilities are important components for entry into a nascent industry, it is 
likely that they engage in product commercialization. 
De Novo Entrants in the Market for Technology 
De novo startups are created for the context of the new industry; therefore, their 
technical capabilities are presumably a better fit for the requirements of the nascent industry 
(Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco & Sarkar, 2004; Khessina & Carroll, 2008; Klepper & 
Sleeper, 2005). Although technical capabilities of de novo firms are critical for developing 
new products, they typically lack complementary assets. Scholars have noted that when 
complementary assets are important, technology startups may be more advantaged in the 
market for technology, rather than the market for products (Gans & Stern, 2003; Teece, 
1986). Accordingly, participation in the market for technology in either form of technology 
licensing or technological acquisition is the most common outcome for startups. While the 
industry evolution literature views lack of product commercialization as failure, 
entrepreneurship scholars consider acquisition as an important mode of value capture for 
successful startups (Arora & Nandkumar, 2011; Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006) and a desirable 
outcome for venture capital firms (Gompers, 1995). Indeed, among exit strategies of startup 
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firms, acquisitions often surpass initial public offerings strategy (Arikan, 2003; Brau, Francis 
& Kohers, 2003).  
In the context of agricultural biotechnology, startup firms largely had technical 
capabilities in the area of plant biotechnology, and many of them were university research 
spinoffs. For example, Mycogen  a startup formed in 1982 by a biochemist from Stanford 
University  discovered several toxins that can be encapsulated in transgenic plants and 
make them resistant to pests. Another example is Mendel Biotechnology  a startup formed 
in 1997  which discovered genetic traits to enhance drought tolerance of soybeans and corn. 
These technical capabilities under control of startup firms were critical components of the 
new product development process. Therefore, startup firms with access to these technical 
capabilities were likely to be acquired. In particular, Arora and Nandkumar (2011) suggested 
that if the acquisition deal value exceeds that of all rounds of venture capital investment in a 
startup firm, the acquisition could be categorized as a successful mode of value capture. 
Among seven de novo startups that were acquired in the context of agricultural 
biotechnology, five startups received venture capital investments. The dollar value of some 
acquisitions are undisclosed. But, for the remaining firms, the dollar value of acquisitions 
exceeded venture capital investment in all but one case. As an illustration, Athenix 
Corporation was acquired by Bayer CropScience in a deal that exceeded its venture capital 
investment by eight times. Table 1-4 provides additional details. 
[Table 1-4 about here] 
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Value Capture by Incumbents through Leveraging Complementary Assets 
Existing research shows that industry incumbents, owners of complementary assets, 
may capture some of the economic benefits of a technology breakthrough despite their lack 
of technical capabilities if they could imitate an innovative product due to weak intellectual 
property regimes (Gans & Stern, 2003; Teece, 1986), if isolating mechanism related to 
complementary assets provide incumbents with the time and resource luxury to adjust to the 
new technology regime at a later time (Tripsas, 1997), or if they are able to integrate into 
technology development and collaboration with owners of technical capabilities (Rothaermel, 
2001). Under these conditions, an industry incumbent typically survives the consequences of 
a technological change and continues to operate as a firm in the new industry regime.  
Drawing on the insights from agricultural biotechnology, we underscore another 
mechanism through which complementary assets of industry incumbents may prove 
beneficial at the face of a technological change. When complementary assets preserve their 
value within the new technology regime, new entrants to an industry face limitations in in-
house development of complementary assets, and if industry incumbents cannot gain access 
to the technical capabilities of the new industry regime, it is likely that incumbent firms get 
acquired. In other words, instead of industry incumbents bringing the technological 
capabilities of new entrants in-house, they were entrants that could internalize the 
complementary assets of industry incumbents. Accordingly, rather than facing failure 
through dissolution, the assets embodied in the incumbents could be leveraged by other firms 
through post-acquisition integration (Fortune & Mitchell, 2012). This situation may resemble 
the phenomenon of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942), where industry incumbents are 
replaced by new entrants; however, the fundamental difference between this context and the 
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generic depiction of creative destruction is that the firm-level displacement of incumbents by 
new entrants is accompanied by economic value capture by industry incumbents and 
retention of their capabilities within the ecosystem of the nascent industry. This is the 
phenomenon that occurred within the context of agricultural biotechnology. 
In the context of agricultural biotechnology, complementary assets of conventional 
agriculture incumbents enabled lucrative exit of firms through being acquired. In the 
aftermath of the agricultural biotechnology breakthrough, the necessary knowledge to 
perform genetic modification was in the realm of biotechnology and proved inaccessible to 
conventional plant breeders. Nonetheless, elite varieties of crops that were developed under 
the conventional agriculture regime were still required as a platform for genetic modification 
and thus served as critical complementary assets. Importantly, it was infeasible for new 
entrants to pursue in-house development of these complementary assets due to time 
compression diseconomies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) and intellectual property protection 
provided by the Plant Protection Varieties Act. Hence, even though conventional agriculture 
firms did not commercialize a product in the new industry regime, their stocks of 
complementary assets enabled them to capture economic value from their investments in 
agricultural biotechnology. These complementary assets were indeed so valuable and limited 
in supply that acquiring firms engaged in preemptive activities to lock-out their competitors 
from gaining access to them. These preemptive behaviors and excessive bargaining raised the 
dollar value of acquisitions, increasing the extent to which industry incumbents could reap 
economic benefits within the new industry regime.  
For instance, Holden’s Foundation Seeds, a corn breeder that initiated its investments 
in the agricultural biotechnology in 1991, was acquired in 1997 for 1.02 billion dollars. The 
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motive of the acquisition was gaining access to the elite varieties of corn under control of 
Holden’s Foundation Seeds. Due to being private firms, financial accounts of conventional 
agriculture firms’ productivity are not available to compare the pre- and post-acquisition 
value of these companies. However, several historical accounts of these acquisitions indicate 
that acquisition deal dollar values were more than what would have been expected prior to 
agricultural biotechnology and thus could be considered lucrative value capture outcome. In 
the case of Holden’s acquisition, it was considered “a big seed deal whose price raises 
eyebrows” (New York Times, 1997) or “a substantial but justifiable premium to reflect the 
strategic importance of the deal” (Financial Times, 1997). 
DEVELOPMENT OF INNOVATION ECOSYSTEMS 
In this section, we elaborate on the industry-level consequences of firm technological 
investments in a nascent industry and the extent to which these activities contribute to 
industry incubation. Although the classic model of industry evolution maintains that producer 
firms with a commercialized product comprise an industry, accounts of incubation of nascent 
industries indicate that many more firms are involved in technological investment within a 
nascent industry. Given that many investing firms do not commercialize a product and are 
not considered core firms within the industry, it is essential to understand their potential role.  
Existing literature holds that there may be positive ramifications associated with 
failure and exit of firms from the industry landscape. The excess entry that precedes firm 
failure in an industry may influence the strategic choices of investing firms so that they 
engage in more innovation and enhance their capabilities. Thus, the population of 
commercializing firms in an industry becomes a stronger population after exit of other firms 
(Knott & Posen, 2005). In addition, the technical expertise and resources of firms that exit 
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the industry may benefit other firms in the form of knowledge spillovers (Hoetker & 
Agarwal, 2007). Although these mechanisms may play an important role in reducing the 
negative consequences of firm failure for the population of surviving firm and in turn 
advance incubation of a nascent industry, these are unintentional outcomes of firm failure 
and the economic benefits are reaped by the surviving firms. We suggest that the positive 
implications of firms’ technological investments despite lack of product commercialization 
extend beyond the unintentional knowledge spillovers (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007) or 
competition effects (Knott & Posen, 2005). Rather, firms may contribute directly to the 
incubation of an industry by deliberate participation in the innovation ecosystem.  
Accounts of nascent industries and technologies underscore the need for firms to 
embed themselves within an innovation ecosystem, often marshaling resources and 
capabilities from the existing institutional infrastructure (Adner, 2006; Adner & Kapoor, 
2010; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001). For example, successful commercialization of electric 
lighting required Edison to undertake significant investments and efforts to embed the 
incandescent bulb in an ecosystem that included suppliers, complementors, investors and 
lead users, while simultaneously ironing out critical technological issues surrounding the 
feasibility of electric lighting (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001). Similarly, product 
commercialization within the context of agricultural biotechnology required gaining access to 
critical sources of technical capabilities and complementary assets that reside in the 
innovation ecosystem. 
We suggest that the flipside of firm-level economic value capture by firms is their 
contribution to incubation of a nascent industry in the form of support roles in innovation 
ecosystems. When participating in the market for technology, a firm provides its technology 
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and capabilities to a third party that serves as a conduit for bringing the technology into the 
product market (Gans & Stern, 2003). Alternatively, acquired firms in technological 
acquisition provide necessary technical capabilities (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Chadhuri & 
Tabrizi, 1999) and human capital (Paruchuri, Nerkar & Hambrick, 2006; Puranam & 
Srikanth, 2007) to their acquiring firms. Moreover, acquisitions of complementary assets 
may enable post-acquisition redeployment of key assets in a way that facilitates product 
commercialization (Karim & Mitchell, 2004).  
Within the context of agricultural biotechnology, the primary mode of value capture 
for 40.7 percent of investing firms was technology licensing or acquisitions. As these 
investing firms captured economic value through different modes, they also participated in 
formation of an innovation ecosystem of an industry. Although diversifying firms are 
considered the focal entrant to the agricultural biotechnology industry, startups and 
conventional agriculture firms also contributed critical resources and capabilities to the 
emerging industry. Product commercialization by diversifying firms occurs as a result of 
firms’ internal capability development as well as integration of complementary assets of 
industry incumbents and technological capabilities of startup firms. In other words, product 
commercialization by these firms is enabled through development of an innovation 
ecosystem. Not only does this innovation ecosystem development enable product 
commercialization, but it also provides the opportunity for economic value capture for 
startups and conventional agriculture incumbents. Indeed, internal capability development of 
diversifying entrants may not have been as effective without their external capability 
sourcing efforts.  
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Taken together, even if technological investments of firms do not lead to product 
commercialization, the alternative modes through which they capture economic value imply 
that they directly contribute to the incubation of an industry through participation in the 
innovation ecosystem. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This essay examines the incubation stage of an industry life cycle, which is an 
important but overlooked phenomenon in the strategic management and industry evolution 
literature. Accounting for firms’ investments in a new technology prior to their product 
commercialization enables us to examine important aspects of incubation of a nascent 
industry including heterogeneity in firm type, heterogeneity in mode of value capture and 
development of innovation ecosystem. Below, we summarize some of the noteworthy 
contributions. 
To the industry evolution literature, we present firms’ investment life cycle for the 
agricultural biotechnology industry. In doing so, we document an industry-level incubation 
stage that lasted for 18 years. Despite the prevalence of incubation stage across various 
industries, strategic management scholars have largely abstracted away from studying this 
timeline. Another important observation regarding the investment life cycle is its similarity to 
the commercialization life cycle in terms of patterns and slope despite the difference in the 
scales of the two charts. Nonetheless, this study is a single-industry analysis; thus, results 
should be generalized with caution. Although this essay is a primary attempt in reporting 
some trends, it helps in identifying some important future research questions. Future research 
embarking on multiple-industry data may identify additional stylized facts and evolutionary 
patterns related to incubation stage at the industry-level of analysis. 
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We also show the heterogeneity in the type of investing firms in a nascent industry. 
All three types of firms, namely, startups, diversifying firms, and conventional agriculture 
incumbents, are present in relatively equal numbers as investing firms. However, diversifying 
entrants are dominant in product commercialization. Thus, contrasting inferences about 
demography/composition of firms in an industry may be made based on investment patterns 
as opposed to commercialization patterns. This empirical finding underscores the future 
research opportunities that reside in analysis of firm’s investment patterns.  
Moreover, we discuss different modes of value capture by heterogeneous investing 
firms. Commercialization of a product and survival despite technological change has been 
portrayed as the desired outcome for firms. This essay documents that product 
commercialization is not the only mode of value capture for investing firms. Some of the 
investing firms captured value when licensing their technologies or exit through acquisition. 
The firm-level value capture is indeed accompanied by contribution to the development of 
innovation ecosystems, and thus indicates that firm-level survival may not necessarily be the 
sole desirable outcome for firms at the face of a technological change. 
We further study how the heterogeneity in firm type − incumbent, startup, or 
diversifying firms − influence the mode of value capture. We find that diversifying entrants 
are more likely to engage in product commercialization in the context of agricultural 
biotechnology, whereas technology licensing and exit through acquisition are the dominant 
modes of value capture for startups and incumbents. With regard to diversifying firm, our 
results underscore the importance of strategic renewal and corporate entrepreneurship of 
established firms for creation of new industries (Agarwal & Helfat, 2009). Although startups 
do play a critical role in providing some technological capabilities in the overall ecosystem of 
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firms, the main innovative activity takes place within diversifying entrants; therefore, 
analysis of the entrepreneurial actions of established firm and their strategic renewal efforts 
may provide valuable insights about incubation of nascent industries.  
With regard to startups’ mode of value capture, the entrepreneurship field has 
identified both acquisitions and alliances as important strategic levers for entrepreneurial 
firms. This is despite the presumption in the industry evolution literature that considers lack 
of product commercialization as failure. We show that even if an entrepreneurial firm may no 
longer exist, value creation may continue and value capture might have already occurred. 
From the perspective of an investing firm, it is important to consider the prospects of 
economic value capture from a new technology. Similarly, firms may use market for 
technology as a comparable alternative to product commercialization (Gans & Stern, 2003).  
This essay also contributes to the literature about role of complementary assets during 
times of technological change. Existing literature notes that owners of complementary assets 
may survive the gales of creative destruction and retain their market share in the new 
technology regime in spite of their technologically inferior products (Rothaermel, 2001; 
Tripsas, 1997). We show that valuable complementary assets may lead to acquisitions of 
owners of complementary assets. Incumbent firms, owning key complementary assets, do not 
survive as a firm, but they are acquired. Their displacement by new entrants is indeed 
accompanied by their firm-level value capture as well as redeployment of their key assets 
within the ecosystem of the nascent industry. 
Another contribution is to the literature stream of the fate of firm’s capabilities in a 
system. This is in line with prior literature that highlights how capabilities of out of business 
firms continue to exist in the industry (Fortune & Mitchell, 2012; Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007). 
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An important empirical observation with regard to agricultural biotechnology industry is that 
14.5 percent of investing firms eventually commercialized a product. When accounting for 
firms that join an innovation ecosystem, a survival rate of 14.5 percent which is observed in 
the chart comparing investing firms and firms that have commercialized a product, will 
actually turn out to be a 55.2 percent survival rate in terms of the number of firms. The 
implication is that even though the original owner of those capabilities no longer exists at the 
firm level or could not commercialize a product, the capabilities continue to live and be used 
by others. Therefore, by focusing on value capture of all types and not limited to product 
commercialization, we show how resources and capabilities of firms may remain in the 
industry ecosystem and in turn contribute to the incubation of an industry.  
The first essay of my dissertation underscores the importance of studying firm’s 
investments in a nascent industry prior to product commercialization. Analyses of firm’s 
technological investments enabled us to provide evidence of heterogeneity in firm types and 
modes of value capture during the incubation stage of industry life cycle. The implications of 
these findings might have been very different if the sole focus of analysis had been on firms’ 
product commercialization. This essay, thus, identifies a prominent avenue for future 
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Table 1-1: Timeline of Notable Events in the Agricultural Biotechnology Industry 
 
Prior to Agricultural Biotechnology 
1865 Gregor Mendel’s experiments with pea plants 
1901 A Japanese bacteriologist isolated Bacillus thuringiensis from infected silkworms. 
1907 USDA plant pathologists discovered Agrobacterium tumefaciens  a rod-shaped soil 
bacterium that infects plant cells and causes crown gall disease. 
1924 The first hybrid corn seed is commercialized. 
1970 The U.S. Plant Protection Variety Act is enacted, providing breeders up to 25 years of 
exclusive marketing rights over new, distinct, uniform and stable sexually reproduced 
plant varieties. 
  
Incubation of Agricultural Biotechnology Industry 
1977 Van Montagu and Schell of the University of Ghent discovered a gene transfer 
mechanism via the soil bacterium Agrobacterium tumefaciens. 
1980 The Supreme Court ruled that biological organisms are eligible for utility patent 
protection in the ‘Diamond vs. Chakrabarty’ case. 
1983 Viability of genetic modification of plants was shown due to identification of a marker 
gene. 
1986 The coordinated framework for regulation of biotechnology is devised by the federal 
government. 
1987 The first gene gun, an alternative to the use of plasmids and viruses to deliver genetic 
information into cells, was developed by John Sanford. 
  
 Agricultural Biotechnology Era 
1995 Calgene introduced the first herbicide-tolerant cotton. 
1996 Monsanto introduced a variety of transgenic crops, including herbicide-tolerant 
Roundup Ready Soybeans and insect-resistant Bollgard cotton. 
1998 Monsanto acquired Calgene. 
1998 Dow Chemical acquired Mycogen.  
1999 DuPont acquired Pioneer Hi-Bred Company. 
2000 Syngenta was established following the merger of AstraZeneca (a merger of Astra and 











Table 1-2: Summary Statistics, # Investing Firms 
(Percentage in parentheses) 
Investing Firm 
Type 
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Table 1-3: The Effect of Firm Types on Mode of Value Capture 
 











    
Startup =1 0.165** 6.284*** 0.100*** 
 (0.136) (3.760) (0.087) 
    
Incumbent =1 1.540 3.846** 0.205*** 
 (1.967) (2.387) (0.107) 
    
Investment Year 1.103 0.780** 1.067 
 (0.084) (0.094) (0.066) 
    
# Investing Firms 0.937 1.215 0.978 
 (0.076) (0.148) (0.102) 
    
# Investing Firms, Squared 0.997 0.998 1.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 69 69 69 
 
Diversifying Entrants are the comparison group. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 1-4: Comparison of a Firm’s VC Investment and Acquisition Value 






Capital Investment  
($ Million) 
Athenix Corporation 2009 400 52 
Biotechnica 1994 undisclosed 14 
Exseed Genetics 2000 undisclosed not available 
Mycogen 1998 Above 420 23 
Plant Genetics Inc 1989 12 25 
Plant Genetics System 1996 undisclosed not available 





CHAPTER 3: ESSAY 2 
PRE-ENTRY OR PRE-INVESTMENT CAPABILITIES?  
THE ROLE OF CAPABILITY RECONFIGURATIONS FOR MARKET ENTRY 
INTO NASCENT INDUSTRIES 
 
Entrepreneurial entry of firms into nascent industries and the ensuing change in the 
competitive landscape of industries have been a topic of extensive research across 
economics, strategy, and entrepreneurship literatures. In particular, scholars have focused on 
the capability antecedents of a firm’s entry into a nascent industry, highlighting the effect of 
a firm’s pre-entry capabilities on the likelihood of firm entry (Klepper & Simons, 2000; 
Mitchell, 1989). In most of these studies, entry of a firm into a new industry is defined by its 
first product commercialization within that industry (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002); likewise, 
the point of inception of a new industry is defined by the first industry-level product offering 
(Gort & Klepper, 1982). However, prior to the first instance of product commercialization, 
firms are typically involved in technological investments in order to transform technological 
opportunities to commercially valuable products. Similarly, industries often undergo an 
incubation period, defined as the period between the introduction of a discontinuous 
technological change and the first instance of product commercialization. Despite the 
importance of firm-level investments undertaken in anticipation of incubation of a new 
industry, the implications of these investments for entrepreneurial foray of firms are less 
examined. This is an important unaddressed gap because analysis of this period may provide 
important insights about the capability antecedents of firm entry into nascent industries. 
Specifically, the question of how a firm’s capability portfolio at the time of initial 
investment in a nascent industry influences a firm’s market entry has been understudied. If a 
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firm’s technological investments in a new industry take place at a time prior to market entry, 
then there is a need to study how a firm’s entry into a nascent industry depends on its 
capabilities at various points in time. Are the same types of capabilities that are critical at the 
time of market entry also the distinguishing factor when examined at the time of initial 
investment? If not, what are the pre-investment capabilities that may put firms in an 
advantageous position for entry into a nascent industry? These questions become more 
important given the possibility that a firm’s investment efforts may entail a reconfiguration 
of the firm’s existing resource base and capability portfolio according to the requirements of 
the new industry. 
In this essay, I examine the pre-investment capabilities that are related to the 
likelihood of a firm’s market entry into a nascent industry. Based on the premise that firms 
initiate their technological investments toward a nascent industry at a time before their first 
product commercialization, I make a distinction between a firm’s pre-entry and pre-
investment capabilities. By pre-investment capabilities, I refer to the capabilities that a firm 
possesses prior to its initial technological investment in the industry. I draw on the existing 
literature that has emphasized a firm’s technical capabilities (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; 
Henderson & Cockburn, 1994) and complementary assets (Gans & Stern, 2003; Teece, 1986) 
as key drivers of entry into nascent industries. In this literature, the positive relationship 
between possession of these capabilities and the likelihood of entry into nascent industries 
has been examined based on the conceptualization of pre-entry capabilities as the stock of a 
firm’s capabilities at the time of market entry (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). My empirical 
findings corroborate these well-established relationships. However, I show that at the time of 
initial technological investment, a firm’s reconfiguration experiences become the key pre-
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investment factor. Indeed, reconfiguration experiences – i.e., a firm’s experiences in 
modifying its capability portfolio prior to its investment in the focal industry – enable a 
firm’s efforts in gaining access to the technical capabilities and complementary assets that 
have been suggested as crucial pre-entry capabilities. By explicitly theorizing a mediating 
role for pre-entry technical capabilities and complementary assets, I show that pre-investment 
reconfiguration experiences affect the likelihood of entry through their influence on pre-entry 
technical capabilities and complementary assets. 
The empirical context of this essay is the U.S. agricultural biotechnology industry. 
Agricultural biotechnology is the use of modern biotechnology techniques to improve or 
modify plants. The focus of these genetic modifications has typically been enhanced 
agricultural traits such as herbicide tolerance, pest resistance, and resistance to environmental 
stresses. I base my analysis on the population of firms that have made technological 
investments in agricultural biotechnology during 1980-2010. Firms are required to seek 
permits from the USDA to conduct experiments with their transgenic crops outside the 
conditions of the laboratory. Applying for these permits implies that a firm has devoted 
resources toward the agricultural biotechnology industry, and thus indicates a firm’s 
technological investments in this field. This approach enables me to compile the 
comprehensive list of firms that are engaged in entrepreneurial activity in agricultural 
biotechnology prior to product commercialization. In addition, a firm’s capability portfolio 
prior to initial investment and prior to market entry can be distinctly identified.  
This essay contributes to the research literature in strategic management, industry 
evolution and entrepreneurship. To the strategic management literature, I underscore the 
time-varying nature of firm capabilities during the incubation period. By making a distinction 
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between a firm’s capabilities at the time of market entry and at the time of initial 
technological investment, I show that different factors explain the likelihood of a firm’s entry 
at different times. While the stock of pre-entry technical capabilities and complementary 
assets is related to the likelihood of firm’s entry into a nascent industry, at the time of 
investment, a firm does not necessarily need to possess the technical capabilities and 
complementary assets that are required for successful operation in the industry. Rather, it is 
important for a firm to be able to develop technical capabilities and complementary assets 
during the incubation period.  
In addition, this essay draws attention to the endogenous sources of heterogeneity in 
pre-entry capabilities across firms (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). My hypotheses build on the 
literature regarding the role of a firm’s pre-entry capabilities (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; 
Carroll, Bigelow, Siedel & Tsai, 1996; Helfat & Lieberman, 2002; Klepper & Simons, 2000; 
Mitchell, 1989) and extend it by accounting for the capability reconfiguration efforts that are 
undertaken by firms in anticipation of entry into a nascent industry. Rather than presuming a 
firm’s pre-entry capabilities as exogenous factors that are leveraged to the new industry 
context, I highlight that pre-entry capabilities are indeed endogenously developed prior to 
entry. This heterogeneity in pre-entry capabilities is related to a firm’s pre-investment 
reconfiguration experiences and potential superior dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano & 
Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003).  
To the entrepreneurship literature, this essay provides novel insights about the 
capability drivers of entrepreneurial entry of firms into nascent industries and its implications 
for new industry formation. Particularly, it emphasizes that a more complete understanding 
of the antecedents of a firm’s entry into a nascent industry may be gained by analysis of the 
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dynamics of the time period between a firm’s initial technological investment and market 
entry. Given that potential entrants do not have the option to enter the industry through 
outright acquisition of industry incumbents, both the entrepreneurial entry of firms and the 
concomitant creation of the new industries, rely on the strategic investments of potential 
entrants prior to commercialization in an industry that is not yet in existence itself. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
I begin with a review of the existing literature regarding the role of a firm’s pre-entry 
capabilities and its connections to the reconfiguration strategies literature, based on which I 
then develop a set of hypotheses relating a firm’s pre-investment experiences to the 
likelihood of entry into nascent industries. 
“Stocks” of Technical Capabilities and Complementary Assets  
Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), 
existing literature in strategic management and entrepreneurship has noted that firms with 
capabilities relevant to the requirements of an industry are more likely to enter into those 
industries (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). In particular, technical capabilities (Helfat & 
Raubitschek, 2000; Henderson & Cockburn, 1994) and complementary assets (Teece, 1986) 
of a firm have been consistently emphasized as two critical factors for successful commercial 
performance within nascent industries.6 While access to technical capabilities enables a 
                                                 
6  While this essay predominantly focuses on the capability drivers of firm entry, managerial cognition 
regarding new industries (Kaplan, 2008) are also important. Given the sample creation of this essay, 
cognition explanations are empirically addressed. In an ideal empirical design, a researcher would 
first see which firms decide to make the initial investment and then deal with capability drivers at the 
second stage.  
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firm’s efforts in transforming technological opportunities to an innovative product, 
complementary assets are required for appropriating economic benefits from a new product. 
Technical capabilities are a crucial source of competitive advantage within nascent 
industries. By technical capabilities, I refer to a firm’s expertise in the technology or 
scientific disciplinary area of the nascent industry. Creation of new products typically 
requires leveraging a firm’s stock of technical capabilities as well as effective recombination 
across different areas of technical expertise. Thus, access to the underlying technical 
capabilities of a nascent industry could form the foundation for development of new products 
(Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000) and subsequent market entry into a nascent industry.  
Existing literature has noted that access to technical capabilities of the focal industry 
is positively associated with new product development (Danneels, 2002; Katila & Ahuja, 
2002; King & Tucci, 2002; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Nerkar & Roberts, 2004), research 
productivity (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994) and intensity of R&D spending (Helfat, 1997). 
Pre-entry technical capabilities are also critical drivers of a firm’s decision to enter a new 
industry across various groups of entrants to a new industry. For instance, diversifying 
entrants typically leverage technical capabilities from their prior operations in other 
industries (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; Klepper & Simons, 2000), while de novo entrants 
typically draw on technical capabilities gained during previous employment experiences of 
their founding team (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco & Sarkar, 2004; Klepper & Sleeper, 
2005). Furthermore, similarities between a firm’s stock of technical capabilities and the 
capability profile of other industries may be a source of related diversification (Chatterjee & 
Wernerfelt, 1991; Silverman, 1999). Drawing on this research stream: 
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Stylized Fact 1: The level of pre-entry technical capabilities is positively related to the 
likelihood of market entry into a nascent industry. 
 
The second key factor for market entry into new industries is the extent to which a 
firm has access to complementary assets. Complementary assets refer to downstream market-
related factors, such as manufacturing facilities, distribution channels, brand name, and 
complementary technologies, which facilitate product commercialization (Teece, 1986). 
Absent complementary assets, innovative products may not reach customers, or customers 
may not experience the full value of an innovative product; therefore, a firm lacking 
complementary assets may not fully capture the economic value that is created by its 
innovative product. Access to complementary assets is, thus, critical for commercialization of 
innovative products (Gans & Stern, 2003; Teece, 1986). Importance of complementary assets 
has been examined for operations across a variety of industries. For instance, sales and 
service relationships of firms in the medical diagnostic imaging industry (Mitchell, 1989), 
specialized manufacturing capabilities and proprietary font libraries in the typesetters 
industry (Tripsas, 1997), and distribution channels in the pharmaceutical industry 
(Rothaermel, 2001) have been identified as key complementary assets.  
Complementary assets are so important that they may act as a shielding mechanism 
and enable industry incumbents to operate in a new technology regime that has rendered their 
R&D capabilities obsolete (Rothaermel, 2001; Tripsas, 1997). Moreover, diversification of 
firms into other industries may be attributed to the relatedness in complementary assets 
(Silverman, 1999). Possession of complementary assets may also shape the direction of a 
firm’s innovative activities (Helfat, 1997; Nerkar & Roberts, 2004). Further, gaining access 
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to complementary assets has been noted as one of the motives for alliance formation 
(Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Gans, Hsu & Stern, 2002). Drawing on this research stream: 
Stylized Fact 2: The level of pre-entry complementary assets is positively related to the 
likelihood of market entry into a nascent industry. 
The above stylized facts highlight that firms are strongly influenced by their stock of 
capability endowments at the time of market entry, so that the nature and size of the 
capability gap determines the likelihood of a firm’s product commercialization in the nascent 
industry. However, these studies typically do not adequately address the source of pre-entry 
capabilities. Do the stocks of technical capability and complementary asset represent 
capability endowments that are passively leveraged by firms to a new industry context? Do 
firms possess the required capabilities given their prior experience in other settings and do 
these pre-entry capabilities provide them “dominance by birthright”? Or, are the stocks of 
pre-entry capabilities endogenously developed by firms via active capability reconfiguration 
in anticipation of entry into a new industry? Additional insights in this regard may be gained 
through a dynamic view that takes into account the possibility of capability reconfigurations 
by firms during the incubation stage and examines the heterogeneity in firm capabilities at 
the time of initial investment. 
Capability “Flows” and Reconfiguration Strategies 
While the industry evolution and entrepreneurship literature has not explicitly 
examined firms’ resource reconfiguration efforts, a parallel research literature in strategic 
management has focused on how firms engage in capability reconfiguration strategies in 
pursuit of strategic renewal (Agarwal & Helfat, 2009). Capability reconfiguration strategies 
refer to the strategies that are undertaken by firms to modify their resource base and 
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capability portfolio (Karim & Mitchell, 2000) and may include addition, deletion or retention 
of capabilities. Capability reconfiguration efforts of firms may resemble flows of capability 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1986) and thus enable firms to achieve the required configuration of 
capabilities for operations in their focal industry.  
In an effort to alter their capability portfolio, firms may add new capabilities by 
engaging in in-house research, employee recruitments (Song, Almeida & Wu, 2003), inter-
firm alliances (Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 1996; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003), 
collaborations with universities (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2007; Zucker, Darby & Armstrong, 
2002), and acquisitions (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Karim & Mitchell, 2000). Alternatively, they 
may delete capabilities by divestment out of existing businesses (Capron, Mitchell & 
Swaminathan, 2001). Moreover, firms typically select between alternative modes (Capron & 
Mitchell, 2009) and take advantage of potential complementarities across these modes of 
change (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; Karim & Mitchell, 2004) through concurrent or 
sequential use of these mechanisms. Once firms gain access to the different components of 
capabilities that reside within and across their boundary, they need to rearrange their 
capabilities to achieve the desired arrangement of capabilities. Redeployment of acquired 
assets (Capron, 1999; Capron, Dussuage & Mitchell, 1998) and integration across externally 
sourced capabilities and internal ones (Karim, 2006; Puranam, Singh & Chaudhuri, 2009) 
enable the firm in so doing. The combination of these efforts may then transform the 
capability portfolio of a firm. Drawing on this research stream: 
Stylized Fact 3: Undertaking reconfiguration strategies through various mechanisms  e.g., 





The question of how existing firms within existing industries reconfigure their 
capability portfolio  as in Stylized Fact 3  has been the focus of several research studies; 
however, this research area has not explicitly looked at a firm’s reconfiguration efforts prior 
to entry into a nascent industry. The incubation stage is characterized by high degree of 
environmental uncertainty, given that the industry is not yet in existence. The uncertainties 
relate not only to the prospects of the industry (whether and when the industry will be 
created), but also to required capabilities for the emerging industry (what and how resources 
need to be configured for potential success). When operating within the context of existing 
industries, firms may conduct some capability benchmarking in order to understand the 
nature of required technical capabilities and complementary assets (Camp, 1989; Teece et al., 
1997); whereas the required capabilities for successful entry into a nascent industry may not 
be ex-ante known. Further, given the incubation stage of the industry, the potential pool of 
target firms for external sourcing of capabilities may not be well developed, or may not have 
capabilities that are already well configured for the focal industry (Jacobides & Winter, 
2005).  
This literature review indicates that a better understanding of capability antecedents 
of a firm’s entry into nascent industries may be gained by combining insights from strategic 
renewal and capability reconfiguration literature into pre-entry experience literature. 
Specifically, in addressing the question of what pre-investment capabilities are associated 
with market entry of firms into a nascent industry, I draw on these two literatures. On the one 
hand, it is well-established in the literature that firms’ stock of pre-entry technical capabilities 
and complementary assets are related to the likelihood of entry into a new industry while 
presuming these capability endowments to be exogenous to entry. On the other hand, 
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multiple capability reconfiguration mechanisms through which firms may modify their 
capability portfolio have been identified; nonetheless, the interrelation between 
reconfiguration strategies in anticipation of entry to an industry and development of the 
required pre-entry capabilities is understudied. To develop hypotheses relating a firm’s pre-
investment capabilities to likelihood of market entry, I link the two literatures by examining a 
temporal relationship between a firm’s capability reconfiguration efforts and possession of 
stocks of pre-entry technical capabilities and complementary assets.  
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
I first examine the sources of a firm’s pre-entry capabilities and identify a pre-
investment factor that is related to development of technical capabilities and complementary 
assets. Firms may possess an initial level of relevant technical capability that enables their 
endeavors in building up additional technical capabilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990); 
however, given that this essay focuses on the incubation period of industry evolution, it is 
unlikely that a firm possesses the required levels of technical capabilities at the time of its 
initial investment. Hence, a firm needs to employ strategies that would enable getting access 
to the technical capabilities required for operations in the nascent industry. As indicated in 
Stylized Fact 3, undertaking capability reconfiguration strategies enables altering a firm’s 
capability portfolio in the form of addition of technical capability. These reconfiguration 
strategies are not, however, without challenge.  
Firms may have the option to develop these capabilities internally or draw on external 
sources of capabilities. Internal R&D in the new technical field may be fraught with 
technological uncertainties given that it is not yet clear whether the technological 
opportunities could be transformed to a commercial product. These technological 
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uncertainties may make firms less likely to pursue irreversible commitment to a 
technological trajectory (Ghemawat, 1991) and thus require some level of experimentation. 
Drawing on the external sources of technical capability, such as university scientists and 
technology-focused startups, also poses challenges. Availability of external sources of 
technical capability is likely to be limited in the early stages of the industry, as all actors are 
still involved in advancing the scientific frontiers of a field. Even when external sources of 
technical capability are available, there may be a need for extensive reconfiguration efforts to 
gain access to those technical capabilities. Beside the information asymmetry between the 
firm and the owner of the technology, the overall value of new technologies is unknown in a 
nascent field. Further, a firm needs to benefit from some processes that facilitate technology 
transfer and knowledge integration within and across its boundaries. If technology sourcing 
occurs through licensing and alliances, firms need access to governance capabilities (Argyres 
& Zenger, 2013) to alleviate the transactional hazards associated with market mechanisms. If 
a firm pursues technological acquisitions, it faces challenges in assessing the value of firms. 
In addition, integration challenges need to be addressed extensively. The technical 
capabilities often reside within the human capital of a firm, which necessitates implementing 
mechanisms to ensure sustained post-acquisition research productivity of inventors (Kapoor 
& Lim, 2007; Paruchuri, Nerkar & Hambrick, 2006). Further, recombining different 
components of technical capability to achieve a firm-specific technology base may be 
needed. 
Given the inherent challenges involved in gaining access to technical capabilities, the 
question is: What pre-investment factors enable a firm to undertake reconfiguration strategies 
that are required to add technical capabilities to its capability portfolio during the incubation 
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stage? I suggest that a firm’s prior reconfiguration experiences are crucial for a firm’s 
development of new technical capabilities. By a firm’s prior reconfiguration experiences, I 
refer to the extent to which a firm has pursued resource and capability reconfigurations prior 
to its investment in the focal industry and for the purpose of changing its resource base for 
operations in existing and non-related businesses to the focal industry. For example, for entry 
into the agricultural biotechnology industry, firms may benefit from prior experiences that 
they accumulated while reconfiguring their capabilities for market entry into other unrelated 
businesses. 
The underlying rationale is that prior reconfiguration efforts may lead to tacit 
accumulation of experience and formal codification of processes required for navigating 
organizational change (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Because firm-specific 
routines form and evolve in a path-dependent manner (Nelson & Winter, 1982), firms that 
have incrementally developed the necessary procedures for undertaking reconfiguration 
strategies may have an advantage in management of the different modes of change within the 
context of a nascent industry. These prior experiences may enable development of specific 
processes for identification of external sources of technology, assessment of the value of the 
technology, governing alliances (Kale, Dyer & Singh, 2002; Sampson, 2005; Zollo, Reuer & 
Singh, 2002), and effective integration of acquired capabilities (Zollo & Singh, 2004). Thus, 
it is more likely that a firm with prior experiences in reconfiguration can replicate the same 
processes to gain access to technical capabilities for its operations in a nascent industry. 
When developing technical capabilities for entry into a nascent industry, a firm’s pre-
investment reconfiguration experiences may enable undertaking the required reconfiguration 
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strategies. Hence, it is more likely that firms with pre-investment reconfiguration experience 
develop pre-entry technical capabilities. Therefore, I suggest: 
Hypothesis 1a: The level of pre-investment reconfiguration experience is positively related to 
the level of pre-entry technical capabilities. 
 
A similar line of reasoning applies for the role of pre-investment reconfiguration 
experience in development of complementary assets. During the incubation period, the nature 
of complementary assets is typically unknown. Before firms design their business models 
and identify strategies for economic value capture, it is not ex-ante clear what types of 
resources and capabilities constitute the complementary assets within the nascent industry. At 
the later stages of industry evolution, early entrants to an industry have already experimented 
with different business models and have identified key complementary assets; therefore, late 
entrants could focus their efforts on gaining access to what has been established as key 
complementary assets within the industry. Moreover, a substantial part of economic value 
capture comes from access to specialized complementary assets for which there is 
dependence between the technology and the complementary assets. Although some industries 
solely rely on generic complementary assets that do not need to be tailored to a specific 
technology or product (Teece, 1986), the required complementary assets for operations in 
nascent technology-based industries are more likely to be of the former type. Because of the 
need for experimentation with alternative business models and value capture approaches, 
identifying the relevant portfolio of specialized complementary assets such as manufacturing, 
distribution, and logistics that are specific to a particular industry is likely to be more 
challenging than leveraging generic complementary assets such as financial capital.  
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Even after a firm has identified relevant types of complementary assets and seeks to 
get access to them, key questions relate to whether these complementary assets could be 
leveraged from other existing businesses of a firm (Mitchell, 1989), whether they could be 
built from scratch, or whether they could be sourced from external owners of complementary 
assets (Rothaermel, 2001). In either case, firms need to address challenges related to 
alleviation of transaction hazards as well as coordination of activities within and across its 
value chain. Prior reconfiguration experiences may enable undertaking these necessary 
activities through formation of governance capabilities (Argyres & Zenger, 2013) and 
integrative capabilities (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; Qian, Agarwal & Hoetker, 2012). 
Therefore, I suggest: 
Hypothesis 1b: The level of pre-investment reconfiguration experience is positively related to 
the level of pre-entry complementary assets. 
 
I next examine the focal question of this essay with regard to identifying the key pre-
investment factor that is related to a firm’s market entry. A critical consideration of a firm at 
the time of initial technological investment is whether it would develop technical capabilities 
and complementary assets by the time of market entry. Accounting for the importance of pre-
entry technical capabilities for entry along with the importance of pre-investment 
reconfiguration experience in developing the pre-entry capabilities, I suggest that prior 
reconfiguration experiences become a critical pre-investment capability. Firms may not 
possess all the required technical capabilities and complementary assets at the time of 
investment; rather, investing firms may pursue strategies that enable development and 
acquisition of the required resources and capabilities during the incubation stage.  
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For instance, investing firms in the agricultural biotechnology industry were involved 
in an array of reconfiguration strategies including research agreements with university 
scientists, alliances with biotechnology startup firms, and acquisitions of seed producers. 
Earlier experiences of these firms in capability reconfiguration provided them with the 
necessary routines and procedures to undertake the extensive reconfiguration strategies in 
anticipation of entry into agricultural biotechnology. This implies that it is not the capability 
gap at the time of investment per se that is critical; rather, a firm’s ability to fill the capability 
gap and to pursue deliberate reconfiguration strategies to modify a firm’s resource base may 
also matter. Thus, likelihood of entry into a nascent industry through product 
commercialization may be related to the extent to which a firm can engage in capability 
reconfiguration strategies during the investment period, as opposed to the stock of capability 
endowments at the time of investment.  
Additionally, prior experiences in reconfiguration imply that a firm has a history of 
organizational change. Entry into nascent industries is a major decision for a firm that 
requires commitment and participation of a firm management and employees. In the presence 
of organizational inertia, firms may become inflexible and resist major changes to their 
current activities (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). However, firms are less likely to build up 
inertia if they have previously undertaken necessary activities for change (Amburgey, Kelly 
& Barnett, 1993) or have pursued diversification into new industries (Chen, Williams & 
Agarwal, 2012). Thus, prior reconfiguration experiences may enhance entry into a nascent 
industry through its effect on overcoming inertial constraints within a firm. Hence, I suggest: 
Hypothesis 2: The level of pre-investment reconfiguration experience is positively related to 




I next discuss how pre-investment and pre-entry factors, when considered jointly, 
influence the likelihood of market entry within a nascent industry. A theory of mediation 
maintains that the mechanism through which two variables are related is explained by 
inclusion of a third mediating variable, in a way that the observed relationship between two 
variables is representing an association between the independent variable and a mediating 
variable, which itself has an association with the dependent variable (MacKinnon, 2008). In 
the context of market entry into a nascent industry, the underlying reasoning for the 
importance of pre-investment reconfiguration experience draws on the proposition that pre-
investment capabilities matter to the extent that they are responsible for accumulating 
technical capabilities and complementary assets. In other words, pre-investment experience 
in reconfiguration influences the likelihood of market entry into a nascent industry through 
its effect on development of the required pre-entry capabilities. Thus, I suggest a mediating 
role played by a firm’s pre-entry technical capabilities and complementary assets, as follows: 
Hypothesis 3a: The level of pre-entry technical capabilities mediates the relationship 
between the level of pre-investment reconfiguration experience and likelihood of market 
entry into a nascent industry, such that the effect of pre-investment reconfiguration 
experience is eclipsed given the presence of pre-entry technical capabilities. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: The level of pre-entry complementary assets mediates the relationship 
between the level of pre-investment reconfiguration experience and likelihood of market 
entry into a nascent industry, such that the effect of pre-investment reconfiguration 
experience is eclipsed given the presence of pre-entry complementary assets. 
 
Overall, these hypotheses explicate how pre-investment reconfiguration experiences 




DATA AND METHODS 
Industry Context 
I empirically test the developed hypotheses in the context of the agricultural 
biotechnology industry. The agricultural biotechnology is the use of modern biotechnology 
techniques to modify crops in ways that enhance agricultural productivity. The product in 
agricultural biotechnology industry is a genetically modified seed that is sold to farmers. Two 
important groups of products in this industry are crops that have been modified to show 
agricultural traits of herbicide tolerance – i.e., the ability of a crop to survive the application 
of an herbicide that would otherwise be expected to harm it – and pest resistance – i.e., the 
ability of a crop to produce a protein that is only toxic to pests. Other agronomic traits that 
have been genetically modified include efficiency in nitrogen use or better tolerance of 
environmental stress such as drought. The revenue potential in this industry arises due to 
farmers’ willingness to pay a price premium for transgenic seeds with a potential to increase 
agronomic productivity and reduce farming costs.  
The agricultural biotechnology industry builds on the applications of modern 
biotechnology for plant sciences. The first viability of genetic modification of plants was 
shown in 1977, when a research group from the University of Ghent in Belgium discovered a 
gene transfer mechanism in plants using Agrobacterium. This technological breakthrough 
laid the foundation for inception of the agricultural biotechnology industry and was followed 
by firms’ and universities’ efforts to achieve additional technological advancements. The 
year 1995 marked the inception of the agricultural biotechnology industry, when the first 
products of agricultural biotechnology – transgenic cotton and squash – were 
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commercialized. Since 1995, additional transgenic crops such as corn, soybeans, papayas, 
sugar beets, and alfalfa have been introduced to the market.  
During the incubation stage of this industry, firms with diverse capabilities made 
technological investments in agricultural biotechnology and experimented with transforming 
this technological opportunity to a product with commercial value. Three types of firms – 
namely, incumbent agricultural firms, de novo startups, and diversifying firms from related 
industries, particularly chemical – invested in agricultural biotechnology. All three types of 
firms had capabilities that were relevant in agricultural biotechnology. For the conventional 
agricultural firms, the advent of biotechnology was a discontinuous technological shock. 
Hitherto, they had relied on plant breeding capabilities, including hybridization, to introduce 
elite varieties of crops. These capabilities continued to be relevant; however, it is imperative 
to integrate plant breeding capabilities with modern biotechnology. The second group of 
firms, de novo startups, largely had agricultural biotechnology knowledge, and many of these 
were university research spinoffs. The final group of firms diversified from related industries, 
mainly with chemical backgrounds. Although they lacked agricultural biotechnology 
capabilities prior to their investments, many of them were engaged in agriculture-related 
products such as herbicides and pesticides. 
Some characteristics of the agricultural biotechnology industry make it an ideal 
context to study the type of pre-investment capabilities that enable entry into a nascent 
industry. First, there has been a relatively long industry-level incubation stage (17 years) as 
well as a firm-level investment period (on average, 10 years). This incubation stage is long 
enough to provide firms with the possibility of altering their resource and capability 
portfolios; accordingly, the distinction between pre-entry and pre-investment capabilities of 
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firms is meaningful. Second, the USDA requires firms to disclose and seek permits to 
conduct experiments with their transgenic crops outside the conditions of the laboratory. 
Thus, firms’ disclosures of their research activities to the USDA enable me to base my 
empirical analyses on the population of firms active in agricultural biotechnology field 
releases. In addition, early indications of a firm’s interest in devoting resources to 
agricultural biotechnology can be identified. 
It should be noted that plant biotechnology – i.e., the science of genetic modification 
of plants – has additional applications in the pharmaceutical, bioremediation, and food 
industries. Since 1977, the possibility of developing transgenic plants that produce 
pharmaceuticals, eliminate toxic pollutants from the environment, or contain enhanced 
nutrients has been explored. However, most of these applications have not yet yielded to any 
commercial product, and do not target agricultural productivity. This essay only focuses on 
the applications of modern biotechnology for the agriculture industry. 
Capability Requirements in Agricultural Biotechnology 
In this section, I describe the technical capabilities and complementary assets that 
should be developed and reconfigured for entry into the agricultural biotechnology industry. I 
use the example of pest-resistant soybeans to elaborate. Pest-resistant soybeans are 
genetically modified to contain toxins that kill specific types of pests. In order to make 
soybeans resistant to pests, a firm needs to understand the genetic structure of soybeans, 
know the nature of external proteins and genes with desirable traits (harmful to pests) that 
could be added to soybeans, and find techniques to insert the external gene or protein into the 
genetic structure of soybeans. These are the technical capabilities in the realm of plant 
biotechnology. Using its plant biotechnology expertise and applying this process on any 
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soybean crop, a firm is able to introduce pest-resistant soybeans. Although the pest-resistance 
trait of soybeans increases crop productivity by reducing pesticide application by farmers, 
pest resistance is only one among several traits of soybeans. In addition to pest resistance, 
farmers seek high-yielding soybeans that exhibit a good fit for the agro-climatic conditions of 
their geographic region. Thus, the pest-resistant soybean becomes valuable for farmers (and 
gains commercial value for firms), if the process of genetic modification is conducted on 
soybeans with an array of other traits. Over the years, conventional plant breeders – through 
the long-practiced process of crossing closely related crop varieties and selecting the ones 
with desired traits – have achieved high-quality varieties of soybeans that provide the other 
traits sought by farmers. These high-quality varieties are referred to as elite varieties or elite 
germplasm7. The elite varieties are used as a platform for genetic modification and have thus 
become critical downstream complementary assets. 
In the general case, expertise in plant biotechnology  i.e., knowledge of gene 
sequences as well as methods of genetic transformation of plants  is considered the key 
technical capability, and access to elite varieties of crops  i.e., crop varieties that have been 
bred to show superior characteristics sought by farmers in each agro-climatic condition  is 
considered the key complementary asset. These are the two capabilities that firms need to 
possess for entry into the agricultural biotechnology industry. 
                                                 
7 Plant germplasm is a living tissue from which new plants can be grown. This can be a seed, or it can 
be another plant part such as a leaf, a piece of pollen, or even a few cells that can be cultured into a 
whole plant. Plant germplasm contains the genetic information for the plant’s hereditary makeup. 




I derive the sample from the comprehensive list of firms that have applied for a 
release permit of a transgenic crop during 1985-2010. United States laws require that all 
firms seek permits from the APHIS (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services) within the 
USDA to conduct experiments with a regulated transgenic plant outside the constraints of 
physical confinement that are found in a laboratory. I consider a firm’s application for a 
release permit as an indication of its technological investment in agricultural biotechnology. 
This approach in sample construction enables me to identify the population of firms that have 
made technological investments in agricultural biotechnology. Moreover, firms’ 
technological investments are observed at the early stages, regardless of product 
commercialization. 
During 1985 to 2010, 16,541 release permit requests were submitted to the USDA 
Biotechnology Regulatory Services. Among these, 3,255 requests (19 percent) were 
submitted by universities or not-for-profit research institutions, and 13,286 requests (81 
percent) were submitted by private firms8. Given my focus on firms’ investments in 
agricultural biotechnology, my sample only includes firms involved in experiments related to 
the agriculture industry, and excludes firms and experiments in other product categories.9 
The included product categories correspond to SIC industry groups of 011 and 013 within the 
                                                 
8 The identities of the organizations applying for 82 requests are not clear based on USDA records 
either because they requested it to remain confidential (55 applications) or because an agricultural 
consulting firm (27 applications) applied for the release permits on behalf of the actual firms; 
accordingly, I exclude these permits (corresponds to 0.6 percent of all permits) from the sample. 
9 This criterion results in excluding 19% of all experiments. As noted earlier in this essay, the science 
of genetic modification of plants has additional applications other than plants with enhanced 
agricultural productivity such as development of transgenic plants that produce pharmaceuticals, 
eliminate toxic pollutants from the environment, or contain enhanced nutrients. 
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major group of agricultural production crops, and include corn, cotton, potatoes, soybeans, 
squash, sugar beets, canola, and alfalfa. Furthermore, I exclude the experiments that have 
been conducted under the control of university technology transfer offices from the current 
sample10. In case the release permit requests by the same parent firm are reported in the name 
of its different subsidiaries, I aggregate them across the various entities for a total count at 
the parent-firm level. 
The final sample includes 69 firms that made technological investment toward 
agricultural biotechnology industry during 1980-2010. For these firms, the analysis is based 
on data compiled from various sources such as the USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture), 
the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), the SEC (Securities and Exchange 
Commission), the FDA (Food and Drug Administration), the USPTO (U.S. Patent Office), 
and the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), as well as 
websites of firms, Compustat, Delphion, LexisNexis and SDC Platinum.  
Model Specification and Estimation 
The unit of analysis in this essay is the firm’s initial instance of technological 
investment in agricultural biotechnology. My interest is in examining whether a firm’s 
technological investment in agricultural biotechnology leads to product commercialization. I 
                                                 
10 My focus in this essay is to examine instances of product commercialization that were undertaken 
by for-profit firms. Although university scientists have been involved in the early stages of 
technology development, they were less likely to engage in product commercialization within their 
universities. The only instance is the case of transgenic papaya, which was introduced in 1997 by 
Cornell University. The transgenic papaya seeds were made freely available to farmers in Hawaii. 
Although I exclude experiments that have been conducted under the control of university technology 
transfer offices, the sample includes experiments that have been conducted by university scientists in 
the context of university spin-offs. 
71 
 
track each investing firm from its initial investment in agricultural biotechnology until its exit 
from the risk pool of product commercialization.  
I use the competing risks event history method (Fine & Gray, 1999) to estimate the 
hazard that a firm commercializes a product in the agricultural biotechnology industry. The 
competing risks estimation method is required for at least two reasons. First, firms may be 
removed from the risk of product commercialization due to occurrence of competing events 
such as getting acquired, or going bankrupt. In addition, the occurrence of each event may 
follow a distinct causal process and functional form. For example, a different set of 
explanatory variables may be related to the likelihood of getting acquired compared with the 
likelihood of bankruptcy. Second, data are right-censored for a few firms that were active in 
2011 and have not yet experienced any of the events.  
In order to conduct a competing risk event history analysis, three issues need to be 
specified: (1) the time at which the firm starts to be at the risk of product commercialization, 
(2) the type of the event experienced by the firm, and (3) the time at which the firm 
experiences an event that removes it from the risk of product commercialization. Below, I 
describe each of these specifications. 
Time of the Initial Investment: A firm’s first instance of investment in agricultural 
biotechnology is considered to be the time at which it becomes at the risk of product 
commercialization. I use the firm’s SEC filings, annual reports, and LexisNexis records to 
identify the first mention of a firm’s involvement in agricultural biotechnology. A firm’s 
involvement in agricultural biotechnology is typically reflected in the form of establishing a 
new research division, engaging in research and development alliances, or acquiring relevant 
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businesses. Although I use USDA records to create my sample, the date of first release 
permit is not assumed to be the first instance of firm investment in the new technology. 
Type of the Event: The focal event of interest in this essay is product 
commercialization by firms; however, there are other competing events such as getting 
acquired and ceasing investment in agricultural biotechnology that remove a firm from the 
risk of product commercialization. My estimation strategy accounts for this heterogeneity in 
outcomes. 
Using the information announced by U.S. regulatory agencies in the United States 
regulatory agencies unified biotechnology website11, I obtain a comprehensive list of 
transgenic crops that are cleared for commercialization in the United States. Products in the 
agricultural biotechnology industry should conform to the regulatory procedures indicated in 
the coordinated framework for regulation of plant biotechnology. Three regulatory agencies, 
the USDA, the EPA and the FDA, evaluate and oversee transgenic plants. I track all firms 
with a transgenic crop that was ready to be commercialized on the basis of regulatory 
requirements, and identify the commercialized transgenic crops using the firm’s reports, 
LexisNexis, and SEC filings. The first instance of product commercialization of a transgenic 
crop by a firm is coded as occurrence of the focal event. 
If a third party acquired a firm’s agricultural biotechnology unit, I code its event as 
getting acquired. In the case of startups, it means that the whole firm was acquired; whereas 
for established firms, it refers to sales of the agricultural biotechnology unit. If a firm ceased 
its investment in agricultural biotechnology, I code its event as ceasing agricultural 
                                                 




biotechnology investment. For the remaining firms that have not experienced either of these 
events, continued investment in agricultural biotechnology as of 2011 is confirmed. Among 
69 investing firms, 10 firms (14.5 percent) have commercialized a product, 22 firms (32 
percent) were acquired, 17 firms (24 percent) ceased their investments in agricultural 
biotechnology, and 20 firms (30 percent) are active as of 2011. 
Time of the Event: For the focal event of product commercialization and the other two 
competing events, the time of event occurrence is recorded on a yearly basis. The median 
time since a firm’s investment until an event for investing firms in the sample is 10 years. 
Explanatory Variables 
Reconfiguration Experiences: In order to measure a firm’s experience in 
reconfiguration, I use the number of times that a firm has reconfigured its units through 
addition or divestment of business segments in the five-year window prior to its investment 
in agricultural biotechnology. This measure is consistent with operationalization of similar 
concepts in the existing literature. For instance, King and Tucci (2002) measured 
transformational experience using a dummy variable indicating whether the firm had any 
transition experience due to entry into new market niches.  
Technical Capabilities: Expertise in plant biotechnology is the technical capability 
required for operation in agricultural biotechnology. I measure a firm’s technical capabilities 
using the (logged) number of agricultural biotechnology relevant patents granted to a firm. A 
firm’s stock of patents is typically used to measure technical capabilities in the prior 
literature (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Nerkar & Roberts, 2004). The list of 7-digit IPCs relevant 
to agricultural biotechnology is compiled based on Graff (2003), which provides a 
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comprehensive analysis of patent classes related to agricultural biotechnology12. Technical 
capabilities are measured at two points in time: (1) at the time of firm’s initial investment in 
agricultural biotechnology, and (2) at the time of product commercialization and other 
competing events.  
Complementary Assets: Within the context of agricultural biotechnology, access to 
elite varieties of crops is considered the key complementary asset. I use the (logged) number 
of protected plant varieties of a firm as an indicator of the extent to which a firm has access 
to a stock of elite varieties of crops. Under the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, plant 
breeders are granted a protection certificate for their new, distinct, uniform, and stable plant 
varieties13. Subject to research and crop exemption, this certificate gives the breeder the right 
to exclude other firms from selling the variety. These complementary assets are measured at 
two points in time: (1) at the time of firm’s initial investment in agricultural biotechnology, 
and (2) at the time of product commercialization and other competing events. 
This measure draws on Teece (1986)’s conceptualization of complementary assets as 
downstream industry-specific resources that facilitate product commercialization. Different 
scholars have identified complementary assets that are relevant to each industry context such 
as the sales and service relationships in the medical devices industry (Mitchell, 1989), 
distribution channels in the pharmaceutical industry (Rothaermel, 2001), proprietary font 
                                                 
12 The full list of patent classes is available upon request. 
13 An alternative measure for complementary assets may be the firm’s stock of patents that cover elite 
varieties of crops. Prior to 1980, firms were only eligible to protect their plant varieties under the 
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970. In 1980, the Supreme Court decision of Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty suggested that firms are also eligible to apply for utility patents for their protected 
varieties. Accordingly, firms typically pursue both intellectual property protection options in parallel 
since early the 1990s. Because the use of patents to protect elite varieties of crops was ineligible in 
the 1980s, it is not relevant for measuring complementary assets at the time of firm’s investment.  
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libraries in the typesetters industry (Tripsas, 1997), ownership of coal reserves in the 
synthetic fuels industry (Helfat, 1997), and infrastructure of switching networks in the 
wireless communications industry (Rothaermel & Hill, 2005).   
Control Variables 
I also control for a number of variables that have been identified as relevant in the 
prior literature. I include Investment Year to represent the differential effect of time. In 
addition, investment year may capture effects of early mover (dis)advantages for product 
commercialization (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). To account for Firm Size, I use a 
dummy variable that equals one for large public firms. Firm size has been suggested to 
influence a firm’s innovativeness (Acs & Audretsch, 1988), or research productivity 
(Henderson & Cockburn, 1996). I also include a dummy variable that equals one for Foreign 
Firm. Due to unfamiliarity with the institutions and collaboration opportunities, foreign firms 
may face different conditions. In addition, evolutionary changes in the industry, measured 
through the density of firms at each year, has been suggested as important in determining 
firm performance (Gort & Klepper, 1982; Hannan & Carroll, 1992); hence, I include the 
linear and quadratic terms for the Number of Investing Firms in agricultural biotechnology at 
the firm’s year of investment. Moreover, I control for Industry Demand in by using the 
acreage (in million acres) of genetically modified crops one year prior to a firm’s experience 
of an event. A large industry demand may allow for product commercialization by more 
firms. For hypothesis 1, I include Firm Tenure in Agricultural Biotechnology as the number 
of years that a firm has been investing in the agricultural biotechnology prior to the focal 
event. In the main models, this variable is already embedded in the structure of a competing 
risk model.  
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Table 2-1 presents the summary statistics and correlation between key variables. 
[Table 2-1 about here] 
RESULTS 
Table 2-2 presents the results of the competing risk model. This table shows the sub-
hazard ratio of which a firm commercializes a product in the context of agricultural 
biotechnology. Because I use a competing risks model, the model accounts for the possibility 
of firm exit through being acquired or through failure. A coefficient larger than one implies 
that the variable of interest has a positive effect on the sub-hazard of product 
commercialization. Model 1 only includes the control variables. Models 2 to 4 include a 
firm’s stock of capabilities at the time of event. Consistent with the existing literature, these 
models show that the stock of a firm’s technical capabilities and complementary assets at the 
time of the event has a positive and statistically significant relationship with the hazard of 
product commercialization. Thus, models 2 to 4 corroborate Stylized Facts 1 and 2. In 
models 5 to 10, I examine the effect of a firm’s stock of capabilities at the time of 
investment. The models show that neither the stock of firm’s technical capabilities, nor the 
stock of firm’s complementary assets has a statistically significant relationship with the 
hazard of product commercialization. Although this is an important non-finding, implying 
that firms lack key technical capabilities and complementary assets at the time of investment, 
this result should be interpreted with caution due to the small sample size. When a firm’s 
prior reconfiguration experience is added as a pre-investment factor in models 7 to 10, this 
variable has a positive and statistically significant relation with hazard of product 
commercialization. The experience gained through each additional instance of 
reconfiguration increases the hazard of product commercialization by 36 percent. Thus, the 
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results corroborate hypothesis 2 – that a firm’s experiences in reconfiguration at the time of 
first investment are important for entry into a nascent industry. 
[Table 2-2 about here] 
To examine the mediation effect in hypothesis 3, I follow Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
approach, which has been used in prior empirical research in strategic management 
(Dushnitsky & Shapira, 2010; Ethiraj, Ramasubbu & Krishnan, 2012; Lee, 2008; Quigley & 
Hambrick, 2012). Tables 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4 present the three conditions required for presence 
of a mediation effect. The first condition is to establish a relationship between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable. The coefficient of pre-investment 
reconfiguration experience in Model 10 of Table 2-2 shows that pre-investment 
reconfiguration experience is positively related to the likelihood of market entry. The second 
condition is to establish a relationship between the independent variable and the mediating 
variables. Table 2-3 uses the Tobit estimation method to show the effect of pre-investment 
reconfiguration experience on mediator variables. The dependent variable in these models – a 
firm’s stock of pre-entry capabilities (logged) – takes values that cannot be smaller than zero; 
thus, a limited dependent variable estimation technique such as Tobit is appropriate. The 
coefficient of reconfiguration experience in model 2 is positive and statistically significant at 
the level of 5 percent, implying that pre-investment reconfiguration experience is positively 
related to pre-entry technical capabilities. This result provides empirical support for 
hypothesis 1a. Similarly, the coefficient of reconfiguration experience in model 4 is positive 
and statistically significant at the level of 1 percent, implying that pre-investment 
reconfiguration experience is positively related to pre-entry complementary assets. This 
result provides support for hypothesis 1b. The third condition is established in Table 2-4, 
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which shows that pre-entry technical capabilities and complementary assets absorb all the 
effect of pre-investment reconfiguration experience on the likelihood of market entry.  
[Tables 2-3 and 2-4 about here] 
A key issue in establishing a mediation relationship is to ensure that mediating 
variables and the dependent variable are theoretically distinct constructs. Based on strategic 
management theories and accounting for temporal precedence of these variables, the 
likelihood of market entry and pre-entry stock of capabilities are indeed two different 
theoretical constructs. It should also be noted that although the theory of mediation implies a 
causal chain of relationships, its empirical design only shows a correlation between variables 
of interest. Overall, these results show that pre-entry technical capabilities and 
complementary assets mediate the relationship between a firm’s pre-investment 
reconfiguration experience and entry into a nascent industry.  
Supplementary Analyses 
To confirm robustness of my empirical results, I conducted additional analyses with 
alternative model specifications. First, I compared the main results based on competing risks 
estimation model with Logit estimation and Cox proportional hazard estimation models. Both 
models corroborate the overall pattern of the reported findings. Second, the results are robust 
for using of the (logged) number of firm’s patents in the international patent class C12N 14 as 
an alternative measure for technical capabilities at the time of firm investment. The 
agricultural biotechnology relevant patent classes identified in Graff (2003) cover all the 
                                                 
14 International patent class of C12N represents micro-organisms or enzymes; compositions thereof, 




agricultural biotechnology patents, and provide an accurate criterion to identify technology 
domains with which a firm should be familiar at the time of entry. However, these patents 
may not be prevalent during the incubation stage of the industry life cycle. Rather, because 
firms often benefit from technical capabilities in related domains that could be leveraged to 
new industries (Silverman, 1999), patent classes in related technological domains, based on 
which agricultural biotechnology is built, may be relevant technical capabilities at the time of 
initial investment.  
An alternative explanation for the empirical findings of this essay may be that a 
firm’s financial standing, rather than the experience accumulated as a result of past 
reconfiguration efforts, is associated with further development of capabilities and the 
consequent entry into the industry. A firm’s financial standing may have three parallel 
effects: first, a firm with more access to financial resources may be at an advantageous 
position in forming alliances or undertaking acquisitions; thus, it may be more likely to gain 
access to required technical capabilities and complementary assets. Second, financial 
resources of a firm may facilitate the extent to which it can enforce its intellectual property 
rights; hence, it may act as an incentive for it to pursue product commercialization. Third, 
financial resources may be related to a firm’s ability to conform to all the regulatory 
requirements; thus, a firm with more financial resources may be more incentivized to pursue 
product commercialization. Since many of the firms in my sample are private firms that are 
no longer active in the industry, their historical financial information is not readily available. 
Similar to the prior work in the area, I am not able to disentangle the effects of financial 
resources from reconfiguration experience in my main models. To the extent that firm size is 
related to a firm’s revenue and financial standing, the control variable for firm size may 
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address this issue. That being said, I further explore this issue through analyses of a 
subsample of firms for which I have detailed financial information. In Table 2-5, I include a 
firm’s revenue as an additional control variable. The effect of a firm’s prior reconfiguration 
experiences is robust to inclusion of this variable. Similar results hold when controlling for a 
firm’s total assets and cash. 
[Table 2-5 about here] 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This essay examines the underlying capabilities that are required for market entry into 
nascent industries. Although firms’ pre-entry capabilities have been suggested as a critical 
factor determining the likelihood of their entry to an industry, existing literature has largely 
conceptualized pre-entry capabilities as the stock of a firm’s capabilities at the time of its 
market entry (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). Drawing on the advances in this literature, the 
current essay addresses a critical research gap: Because firms’ technological investments in a 
new industry start at a time before their market entry, there is a need to distinguish between a 
firm’s pre-entry and pre-investment capabilities. Accordingly, I focus on a firm’s pre-
investment capabilities as key drivers of entry into a nascent industry. 
Using a rich data set of firms’ technological investments within the agricultural 
biotechnology industry, this essay shows that although it is critical for a firm to have access 
to technical capabilities and complementary assets at the time of market entry, these 
capabilities, when measured at the time of first investment, do not explain the likelihood of 
product commercialization. Instead, I identify another capability that has not received 
attention in the literature in industry evolution – the firm’s ability to reconfigure itself and 
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leverage alternative modes of change – as the primary pre-investment capability. Moreover, I 
provide empirical evidence for how a firm’s pre-entry capabilities mediate the relationship 
between a firm’s pre-investment capabilities and the likelihood of entry. 
While these findings have important implications for theory and practice, this is a 
single industry study with potential limitations in generalizability. First, the implications of 
appropriability regimes and intellectual property enforcement need to be considered. 
Following the Supreme Court decision regarding the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty in 
1980 and the case of J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. in 2001, 
which held that biological organisms may be eligible for utility patent protection, the 
biotechnology industry has heavily relied on patents for intellectual property protection. 
Potential entrants to industries with different levels of reliance on patent protection may have 
different incentives regarding entry into those industries. Second, entry into other contexts 
may not require the extensive reconfiguration efforts that were imperative for operations in 
agricultural biotechnology; thus, despite their importance, the magnitude of the effect of pre-
investment reconfiguration experiences may become smaller in other industry contexts.  
This essay also calls for three streams of future research. First, it is an important line 
of research inquiry to distinguish between a firm’s characteristics at the time of investment 
and entry. Future research studies may account for the time-varying nature of firm 
capabilities during incubation and its implications for established theoretical and empirical 
relationships in the field. Second, this essay focuses on how pre-investment reconfiguration 
experiences enable capability development in anticipation of entry to nascent industries. 
Future research in the strategic management field may elaborate on the breadth and depth of 
firm reconfiguration activities prior to entry. Third, this essay examines the likelihood of 
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product commercialization as an important outcome measure for a firm’s investment in a 
new industry. Although this is consistent with the approach in industry evolution literature, 
future research may look at the effect of pre-investment capabilities for post-entry 
performance measures such as survival, innovativeness, financial performance, and growth 
rate. 
This essay provides several theoretical and empirical contributions. To begin with, 
this essay highlights the importance of research analysis of firms’ investments prior to their 
market entry into nascent industries. I suggest that studying entrepreneurial entry of firms 
into a new industry by considering the first product commercialization as the point of firm 
entry into an industry may provide an incomplete picture of when and which firms enter a 
new industry and how firms and industries co-evolve. By explicit analysis of a firm’s 
capabilities at the time of initial investment in an industry, I show that pre-investment 
capabilities required for successful product commercialization may be different from what is 
observed as pre-entry capabilities of a firm at the time of commercialization.  
This essay also adds to the stream of research in the dynamic capabilities literature 
(Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003). While a firm’s prior experiences in reconfiguration have 
been studied in the context of development of dynamic capabilities, this essay emphasizes 
their critical role in enabling a firm’s entry into a nascent industry, and the consequent 
incubation of the industry. The incubation stage of nascent industries has distinct 
characteristics that deserve consideration. For example, entry into established industries may 
be through outright acquisition of firms that are already active in that industry; however, 
given the absence of any producer firms during the incubation stage, entry into nascent 
industries can only be through a firm’s own efforts in capability reconfigurations. In addition, 
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it is not clear as to what the capabilities required for success are and how these capabilities 
should be configured. Thus, this essay joins the two literature streams of dynamic capabilities 
and pre-entry experience to provide insights on critical reconfiguration efforts being made 
prior to entry, particularly prior to inception of a new industry.  
From a managerial perspective, the time of initial investment into a nascent industry 
is the time to make critical strategic decisions regarding entry. Whether or not a firm 
possesses the required capabilities for entry needs to be assessed before a firm’s initial 
investment in an industry. Thus, it is important to understand pre-investment factors that 
enable entrepreneurial entry of their firms into an industry. Research studies that elaborate on 
the required capabilities for entry at the time of initial investment, thus, are especially 
valuable from the standpoint of managers contemplating about entry into nascent industries. 
Empirically, much of the industry evolution literature has operationalized pre-entry 
experience with dummy variables: simple indicators that distinguish diversifying entrants 
from de novo entrants (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; Khessina & Carroll, 2008), and incumbents 
from entrants, or diversifying entrants based on their prior industry of operation (Carroll et 
al., 1996; Klepper & Simons, 2000). Although the heterogeneity in firm type is assumed to 
be indicative of these underlying capabilities, these studies did not use direct measures of the 
capabilities. Another contribution of this essay is to study firm-level heterogeneity by using 
finer-grained measures. Not only do the finer-grained measures of capabilities account for 
the heterogeneity across firm types, but they also enable analysis of the time-varying nature 
of the capabilities.  
Furthermore, I emphasize the role of deliberate reconfiguration efforts, rather than 
passive leveraging of existing resource endowments. Contrary to prior literature that has 
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focused on stocks of endowments, this essay shows that firms actively engage in 
entrepreneurial reconfiguration of capabilities and, in doing so, impact the evolution of a 
nascent industry. In doing so, I disentangle stock and flow effects that prior literature has 
largely attributed to a single concept of pre-entry capabilities. When viewed at the time of 
market entry, my findings are consistent with the existing literature that indicates the 
importance of a firm’s technical capabilities and complementary assets for entry into nascent 
industries. However, at the time of initial investment, it is more important for firms to benefit 
from reconfiguration experiences that enable development of technical capabilities and 
complementary assets. For example, while specialized complementary assets are a source of 
competitive advantage for industry entrants (Mitchell, 1989; Teece, 1986), it is the ability to 
gain access to complementary assets that becomes more important than actual possession of 
them at the time of initial investment. 
Overall, the second essay of my dissertation takes the first step in highlighting the 
importance of firms’ capability reconfiguration efforts prior to entry into nascent industries. 
In particular, I discuss the role of firms’ pre-investment reconfiguration experiences as an 
enabling factor for development of pre-entry capabilities, and the consequent entry of firms 




Table 2-1: Correlation between Key Variables 
 Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Pre-investment Experience in Reconfiguration 2.25 2.39 1 11  1.00           
2 Pre-investment Technical Capabilities 0.48 0.90 0 3.14  0.60 1.00           
3 Pre-investment Complementary Assets 0.92 1.37 0 4.60  0.01 0.08 1.00          
4 Pre-entry Technical Capabilities 1.84 1.91 0 5.58  0.65 0.66 0.16 1.00         
5 Pre-entry Complementary Assets 1.46 1.88 0 6.07  0.34 0.33 0.77 0.43 1.00        
6 Investment Year 1993.19 7.61 1980 2010  -0.42 -0.36 -0.18 -0.61 -0.47 1.00       
7 Firm Size 0.39 0.49 0 1  0.58 0.57 0.29 0.65 0.45 -0.63 1.00      
8 Foreign Firm 0.14 0.35 0 1  0.34 0.31 0.16 0.24 0.09 -0.06 0.26 1.00     
9 # Investing Firms 29.01 12.91 2 47  -0.43 -0.31 0.03 -0.57 -0.34 0.64 -0.53 -0.02 1.00    
10 # Investing Firms, Squared 1006.12 688.14 4 2209  -0.42 -0.28 0.00 -0.50 -0.30 0.52 -0.48 -0.05 0.97 1.00   
11 Industry Demand 1.70 1.66 0 4.17  -0.11 0.06 0.30 0.08 0.21 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.29 0.30 1.00  





Table 2-2: The Effect of Pre-investment and Pre-entry Capabilities on Entry 
   
 Pre-entry Capabilities (Stylized Facts)  Pre-investment Capabilities (Hypotheses 2 and 3)
Sub-hazard ratio of  Entry (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
   
Pre-investment Experience in Reconfiguration   1.161* 1.269*** 1.221** 1.359***
   (0.093) (0.112) (0.118) (0.132)
  
Pre-investment Technical Capabilities   1.014 0.684 0.622
   (0.273) (0.296) (0.234)
  
Pre-investment Complementary Assets  1.388 1.877 2.006
  (0.507) (0.824) (0.929)
  
Pre-entry Technical Capabilities 2.354** 2.527**   
 (0.827) (1.030)   
   
Pre-entry Complementary Assets 1.853*** 1.758***   
 (0.433) (0.362)   
   
Investment Year 1.138 1.251* 1.262** 1.391**  1.184 1.138 1.147 1.257 1.150 1.263
 (0.134) (0.145) (0.146) (0.232)  (0.133) (0.134) (0.121) (0.186) (0.111) (0.183)
  
Firm Size 3.395 2.684 2.033 1.567  2.596 3.350 2.207 1.206 2.785 1.664
 (6.572) (2.984) (3.434) (1.311)  (4.707) (6.710) (4.261) (1.769) (4.887) (2.075)
  
Foreign Firm 1.647 2.280 1.065 1.656  1.830 1.629 1.744 2.044 2.036 2.341
 (1.465) (1.906) (0.932) (1.298)  (1.522) (1.481) (1.426) (1.446) (1.444) (1.408)
  
# Investing Firms 0.975 1.114 1.059 1.231  0.919 0.975 0.966 0.866 0.956 0.836
 (0.117) (0.157) (0.141) (0.172)  (0.109) (0.117) (0.117) (0.123) (0.122) (0.147)
  
# Investing Firms, Squared 0.997 0.993 0.995 0.991  0.997 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.997 0.998
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
  
Industry Demand 1.034 0.627 0.857 0.605*  0.952 1.034 1.022 0.867 1.026 0.838
 (0.189) (0.183) (0.182) (0.137)  (0.200) (0.189) (0.181) (0.192) (0.189) (0.208)
N. Observations 69 69 69 69  69 69 69 69 69 69 
Log pseudo-likelihood -29.882 -25.813 -27.185 -23.394  -29.323 -29.881 -28.708 -27.106 -28.276 -26.421 
Wald Chi2 21.85*** 30.35*** 20.10*** 47.04***  16.14** 22.51** 41.34*** 29.57*** 93.06*** 87.77*** 




Table 2-3: The Effect of Pre-investment Capabilities on Pre-entry Capabilities 
 
DV = Pre-entry Technical Capabilities 
(Hypothesis 1a) 
 DV =  Pre-entry Complementary Assets 
(Hypothesis 1b) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Pre-investment Experience in Reconfiguration  0.250**   0.341*** 
  (0.115)   (0.113) 
      
Pre-investment Technical Capabilities 1.130*** 0.895***  0.768** 0.464 
 (0.291) (0.295)  (0.311) (0.294) 
      
Pre-investment Complementary Assets 0.130 0.202  1.527*** 1.592*** 
 (0.167) (0.163)  (0.191) (0.180) 
      
Firm Tenure in Agricultural Biotechnology 0.162*** 0.152***  0.123* 0.111* 
 (0.045) (0.043)  (0.048) (0.044) 
      
Firm Size 1.472* 0.985  0.436 -0.222 
 (0.584) (0.596)  (0.640) (0.623) 
      
Foreign Firm 0.170 -0.115  -0.586 -0.933 
 (0.635) (0.617)  (0.666) (0.603) 
      
Constant -1.648** -1.801**  -2.776*** -2.960*** 
 (0.593) (0.576)  (0.719) (0.682) 
Sigma       
Constant 1.692*** 1.606***  1.653*** 1.480*** 
 (0.198) (0.188)  (0.227) (0.202) 
N. Observations 69 69  69 69 
Pseudo R2 0.226 0.244  0.326 0.365 
Log Likelihood -97.842 -95.588  -73.787 -69.516 
LR chi2 57.20*** 61.71***  71.28*** 79.82*** 





Table 2-4: The Effect of Pre-investment Capabilities and Mediators on Entry 
 
Sub-hazard ratio of  Entry
(Hypotheses 3a and 3b) 
(1) (2) (3)
 
Pre-investment Experience in Reconfiguration 1.052 1.080 0.967
 (0.120) (0.092) (0.103)
  
Pre-entry Technical Capabilities 2.207* 2.591**
 (0.907) (1.058)
  
Pre-entry Complementary Assets 1.793** 1.783***
 (0.480) (0.371)
 
Investment Year 1.248* 1.248* 1.402*
 (0.146) (0.148) (0.243)
  
Firm Size 2.583 1.546 1.642
 (2.840) (2.642) (1.399)
  
Foreign Firm 2.076 1.151 1.704
 (1.683) (1.017) (1.344)
  
# Investing Firms 1.123 1.048 1.224
 (0.168) (0.143) (0.168)
  
# Investing Firms, Squared 0.993 0.995 0.991**
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
  
Industry Demand 0.628 0.901 0.602**
 (0.188) (0.174) (0.133)
 
N. Observations 69 69 69 
Log pseudo-likelihood -25.714 -26.935 -23.355 
Wald Chi2 29.03*** 27.70*** 49.28*** 





Table 2-5: Robustness Analysis 
Sub-hazard ratio of  Entry (1) (2) (3) 
  
Pre-investment Experience in Reconfiguration 1.246** 
 (0.122) 
  
Pre-investment Technical Capabilities 0.777 
 (0.253) 
  
Pre-investment Complementary Assets 1.781 
 (0.924) 
  
Pre-entry Technical Capabilities 1.924*  
 (0.671)  
  
Pre-entry Complementary Assets 1.653**  
 (0.418)  
  
Investment Year 1.083 1.296** 1.223 
 (0.095) (0.131) (0.181) 
  
Revenue 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
# Investing Firms 0.984 1.182 0.812 
 (0.119) (0.140) (0.187) 
  
# Investing Firms, Squared 0.998 0.994** 1.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
  
Industry Demand 0.919 0.520** 0.871 
 (0.250) (0.163) (0.230) 
  
N. Observations 22 22 22 
Log pseudo-likelihood -21.309 -17.251 -19.768 
Wald Chi2 8.66 28.78*** 15.65** 




CHAPTER 4: ESSAY 3 
FILLING HETEROGENOUS CAPABILITY GAPS:  
RECONFIGURATION STRATEGIES IN ANTICIPATION OF ENTRY INTO 
NASCENT INDUSTRIES 
 
Within the rich literature that spans across economics, sociology, and strategy a 
critical issue relates to performance differentials between heterogeneous firms that enter a 
nascent industry.  De novo startups, diversifying firms and industry incumbents from the 
obsolescing industry differ in terms of their entry patterns (Klepper & Simons, 2000; 
Mitchell, 1989), innovative activity (Khessina & Carroll, 2008), strategic renewal (Chen, 
Williams & Agarwal, 2012) and post-entry survival (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; Carroll, 
Bigelow, Siedel & Tsai, 1996). In this stream of research, de novo or startup firms are those 
that are born in the focal industry context, and diversifying firms are pre-existing firms which 
enter (diversify) into the nascent industry. While the heterogeneity in outcomes across these 
three types of firms has been mostly attributed to the differences in the distinct histories of 
firms and their resource endowments (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002), the precise mechanisms 
by which the heterogeneity in firm type translates into economic outcome are less examined.  
One important mechanism through which heterogeneity in firm type may be related to 
a firm’s economic outcomes is through influencing the capability reconfiguration strategies 
that are pursued by firms in anticipation of entry into the focal industry. Capability 
reconfiguration strategies refer to the strategies that are undertaken by firms to modify their 
resource base and capability portfolio (Karim & Mitchell, 2000) and may include addition, 
deletion, and/or retention of capabilities. Whether entry to a nascent industry is undertaken 
by de novo startups, diversifying firms from related industries or incumbents from the 
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obsolescing industry, a critical strategic action for firms is to engage in capability 
reconfiguration strategies required for filling their capability gap with the nascent industry. 
As different types of firms engage in activities to achieve the required configuration of 
capabilities for operations in the new industry, the content, sequence, and source of their 
capability reconfiguration mechanisms may differ (Agarwal & Helfat, 2009). Because these 
differential capability reconfiguration strategies may lead to persistent effects on firms’ 
subsequent performance, it is critical to understand the differences in the paths that different 
types of firms pursue when reconfiguring themselves for entry into  nascent industries. 
In this essay, I study the extent to which de novo startups, diversifying firms and 
industry incumbents differ in the reconfiguration strategies pursued in anticipation of entry 
into a nascent industry. In the discussion of reconfiguration strategies, I focus on three 
dimensions of content  i.e., what capabilities to reconfigure, sequence  i.e., in what order 
to reconfigure capabilities, and source of capabilities i.e., whether to rely on internal or 
external sources of capabilities. At the time of initial investment in a nascent industry, 
different types of firms may leverage heterogeneous bundles of capabilities, cognition and 
incentives. The differences in the initial conditions of these firms may imply that they pursue 
heterogeneous strategies to prepare themselves for entry into a new industry.  
In terms of the content of capability reconfiguration strategies, I suggest that the 
capability requirements of a nascent industry require firms to narrow their capability gaps 
toward the same portfolio of capabilities. Even though the details of capabilities may differ 
across industries and firms, existing literature predominantly highlights the critical role of 
technical capabilities (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; Nerkar & Roberts, 2004) and specialized 
complementary assets (Gans & Stern, 2003; Teece, 1986) as two general categories of 
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capabilities required for entry into nascent industries. In anticipation of entry into a nascent 
industry, startups, diversifying firms and incumbents focus their reconfiguration strategies on 
achieving the required configuration of technical capabilities and specialized complementary 
assets. In doing so, the content of their reconfiguration strategies is dependent on the types of 
capabilities that they lack as well as the types of capabilities that they possess at the time of 
initial investment. For instance, startups lacking specialized complementary asset are more 
likely to focus their efforts on gaining access to specialized complementary asset from 
scratch, while due to their initial technical capabilities, they are likely to focus their efforts on 
enhancing and modifying their current technical capabilities toward the nascent industry. 
However, in terms of the sequence of capability reconfiguration strategies and sources of 
capabilities, the differences across de novo startups, diversifying firms and incumbents are 
more salient. 
To illustrate the implications of my propositions, I discuss the reconfiguration 
strategies of three firms in the agricultural biotechnology industry in the form of three case 
studies. Specifically, I focus on the capability reconfiguration strategies of Monsanto, 
DeKalb Genetics and Mycogen from the time of their initial technological investment until 
their market entry into the agricultural biotechnology industry as three illustrative examples.  
This essay’s main contribution is to show while reconfiguration strategies of firms in 
anticipation of entry into a nascent industry may focus on achieving the same content of 
technical capabilities and complementary assets, firms may undertake different paths given 
the differences in their initial conditions. In addition, I highlight that all three types of firms 
undertake extensive reconfiguration efforts since the time of their initial investments in a 
nascent industry by the time of market entry. In doing so, I complement the literature that has 
93 
 
emphasized the importance of engaging in reconfiguration strategies for prior industry 
regime incumbents (Lavie, 2006). 
This essay proceeds as follows. I first compare and contrast these three types of firms 
based on dimensions of firm capabilities, incentives and cognition. Then, I suggest how the 
underlying heterogeneity in firm types may be related to the reconfiguration strategies that 
each undertake. Finally, I describe the three descriptive cases from the agricultural 
biotechnology industry.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Performance Differences between Incumbents, Startups and Diversifying Entrants 
Two related literature streams have examined the effect of heterogeneity in firm type 
on various outcome measures when entering into a nascent industry. The first stream 
examines the performance differentials of industry incumbents versus new entrants in the 
face of a discontinuous technological change (Cooper & Schendel, 1976; Henderson & 
Clark, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Drawing on Schumpeter’s (1942) discussion of 
creative destruction of existing industries by new ones, these studies have highlighted the 
tension between incumbents and new entrants during times of technological change, 
specifying conditions under which new entrants may replace industry incumbents. In 
particular, obsolescence of technological capabilities of industry incumbents at times of 
competence-destroying technological change (Tushman & Anderson, 1986) or in presence of 
architectural innovation (Henderson & Clark, 1990) has been noted as major reasons for 
incumbent failure; whereas possession of application-specific R&D capabilities (Sosa, 2009) 
or industry-specific complementary assets (Rothaermel, 2001; Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 1997), 
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which retain value in the new industry, and are costly to access by entrants may favor of 
incumbent advantage. Moreover, managerial processes and organizational structures of 
incumbents (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000), under-investment in 
disruptive technologies that do not cater to current customer needs (Adner, 2002; Christensen 
& Bower, 1996), or anticipation of unfavorable stock market reactions (Benner, 2007) may 
impede incumbent response to the entrepreneurial entry of new firms. Many of the insights 
from this literature are also similar to the dynamics of heterogeneity between incumbents and 
new entrants following any major change in the institutional environment such as industry 
deregulation (Walker, Madsen & Carini, 2002).  
While the above literature focuses on incumbent–entrant dynamics, it does not 
address the heterogeneity within industry entrants. A parallel literature has examined the 
performance differentials across diversifying versus startup entrants (Carroll et al., 1996; 
Ganco & Agarwal, 2009; Klepper & Simons, 2000), while abstracting away from the concept 
of incumbency. Although both diversifying and startup entrants are new to the focal industry 
context, diversifying entrants may leverage some resources and capabilities from their prior 
experiences in other industries. This literature has compared diversifying and startup firms on 
various aspects of post-entry performance such as survival (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; Carroll 
et al., 1996; Klepper & Simons, 2000), growth and strategic renewal (Chen et al., 2012), 
product portfolios (Khessina & Carroll, 2008) and market share (Klepper & Simons, 2000).  
This literature review indicates that researchers have either compared incumbents to 
entrants without distinguishing between diversifying firms and startups, or compared 
diversifying firms to startups while abstracting away from incumbents. Few studies have 
called for making a distinction between the three types of firms (Sosa, 2013) and have 
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compared all three firms simultaneously (Methe, Swaminathan & Mitchell, 1996). I follow 
this stream of research and distinguish between the three types of firms. 
Underpinning Sources of Heterogeneity across Firms 
When entering into a nascent industry, sources of heterogeneity across these different 
firm types may be attributed to their underlying capabilities, cognitive framing of the nascent 
industry and incentives for investment. In this section, I discuss how de novo startups, 
diversifying firms and industry incumbents differ across these dimensions when they seek to 
enter a nascent industry during its early stages. In terms of underlying capabilities, these 
studies underscore the importance of technical capabilities and complementary assets. By 
technical capabilities, I refer to a firm’s expertise in the technology or scientific disciplinary 
area of the nascent industry. While industry incumbents from the obsolescing industry 
typically lack technical capabilities of the new industry regime, technical capabilities have 
been identified as a source of competitive advantage for both de novo and diversifying 
entrants. Since startups are created for the context of the new industry, their technical 
capabilities are core for the new industry and thus presumably a good fit (Agarwal, 
Echambadi, Franco & Sarkar, 2004; Khessina & Carroll, 2008; Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). 
Nonetheless, the related technical capabilities possessed by diversifying entrants have been 
noted to be equally if not more important (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; Carroll et al., 1996; 
Klepper & Simons, 2000; Methe et al., 1996).  
Complementary assets may confer an advantage to established firms relative to 
startups. By complementary assets, I refer to downstream market-related factors which are 
required for profiting from technical capabilities and facilitate product commercialization 
(Teece, 1986). Complementary assets may be generic or specialized for a particular context. 
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While specialized complementary assets are under control of industry incumbents, the 
advantages related to generic complementary assets could be reaped by both industry 
incumbents and diversifying entrants. Because specialized complementary assets such as 
production facilities, distribution channels and marketing expertise are specific to a particular 
context, it is likely that industry incumbents could leverage these industry-specific 
specialized complementary assets from their prior operations (Mitchell, 1989; Rothaermel, 
2001; Tripsas, 1997). Nevertheless, diversifying and de novo entrants typically lack access to 
specialized complementary assets. The case is different for generic complementary assets 
such as the ability to manage businesses, the ability to conduct alliances and acquisitions, and 
access to financial capital (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). Given the presence of both 
diversifying entrants and industry incumbents in pre-existing value chains and the 
experiences gained due to reconfiguration efforts for prior entry attempts, they are likely to 
have accumulated generic complementary assets that could be leveraged to the new industry 
context. For example, diversifying entrants have been found to fare better in the face of 
impediments to growth as they are more likely to engage in strategic renewal (Chen et al., 
2012) and incumbents are better at learning by doing (Balasubramanian, 2011). De novo 
entrants, however, lack access to either form of complementary assets. 
Firms also differ in terms of their cognitive framing of the nascent industry and their 
interpretation of the associated technological change. Managerial cognition may shape a 
firm’s strategic actions during periods of environmental change (Barr, 1998) and may impact 
a firm’s response to technological discontinuities (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan, Murray 
& Henderson, 2003). Similarly, researchers’ beliefs and perceptions about the nascent 
technology may shape their key technical choices (Garud & Rappa, 1994) and in turn impact 
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organizational outcomes. The heterogeneity in the beliefs and assumptions about the nature 
and direction of a technological change may be based on prior experiences of entrepreneurs 
(Shane, 2000) or managers in other industry contexts (Benner & Tripsas, 2012). Thus, prior 
histories of industry incumbents, de novo firms and diversifying firms may lead to their 
distinct cognitive framing of the opportunities within the nascent industry. For industry 
incumbents, past experiences in prior industry regime may impede their efforts in 
identification of opportunities related to the nascent industry (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) and 
thus become core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). However, entrants, regardless of their 
type, may be better at perceiving a wide range of opportunities. Although de novo startups 
have been often associated with flexibility and nimbleness, diversifying firms in the nascent 
industry context also have the ability to overcome organizational inertia that characterizes 
most established firms (Chen et al., 2012).  
Another dimension that differentiates these three types of firms is their differential 
strategic incentives for investment in a new technology. Incumbents often have less incentive 
to invest in new technologies that would replace their existing competences (Arrow, 1962; 
Reinganum, 1983). Moreover, their dependence on a particular group of customers may lead 
to less investment in new technological domains that do not serve existing core customers 
(Christensen & Bower, 1996). However, de novo and diversifying entrants’ investment 
behavior is less likely to be shaped by their existing commitments to particular customer 
bases or technological trajectories. Therefore, they have more incentive to invest in a nascent 
technology.  
Table 3-1 summarizes this discussion. Heterogeneity in de novo startups, diversifying 
entrants and industry incumbents when entering into a nascent industry could be sorted along 
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five dimensions of possession of technical capability, possession of specialized and generic 
complementary assets, cognitive framing of the nascent industry and incentives for 
investment in the new technology. Industry incumbents often benefit from the specialized 
and generic complementary assets that they leverage from their prior operations in the 
obsolete industry. However, they lack access to technical capabilities, have less incentive for 
investment and suffer from incorrect or incomplete cognition of the opportunities within the 
nascent industry. De novo firms may be characterized as the flip side of industry incumbents. 
While they lack specialized and generic complementary assets, they benefit from technical 
capabilities, have high incentive for investment in the nascent technology and are better at 
cognition of the opportunities within the nascent industry. Diversifying entrants lack access 
to specialized complementary assets whereas all the other dimensions are in their favor.  
[Table 3-1 about here] 
In the next section, I draw on these underpinning sources of heterogeneity in order to 
discuss the reconfiguration strategies that different types of firms undertake in anticipation of 
product commercialization and entry into a nascent industry. 
PROPOSITIONS 
For entry into a nascent industry, firms typically need to fill the capability gap that 
exists between their pre-existing endowments of capability and the capability requirements of 
the particular industry context (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). Although potential entrants 
leverage some capabilities from their prior operations to the nascent industry, it is essential 
that they undertake additional capability reconfiguration efforts to achieve the configuration 
of capabilities needed for introduction of products and successful operation within the 
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nascent industry. The second essay of my dissertation discussed two key capability factors 
for successful commercial performance of firms at the face of a technological change that 
characterizes nascent industries. First factor is a firm’s technical capabilities in order to 
develop new products (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; Nerkar & Roberts, 2004), and the 
second is possession of specialized complementary assets in order to appropriate the 
economic benefits of a new product (Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 1997). I also showed that a firm’s 
stock of technical capabilities and specialized complementary assets at the time of market 
entry is positively related to the likelihood of a firm’s market entry into a nascent industry. 
Given the importance of technical capabilities and specialized complementary assets for 
entry into a nascent industry, I develop the propositions of the third essay based on the 
assumption that firms focus their reconfiguration strategies on narrowing their capability gap 
in terms of technical capabilities and specialized complementary assets.  
Capability Gaps and the “Content” of Reconfiguration Strategies 
I first discuss the content of reconfiguration strategies that firms undertake in order to 
fill their capability gap. Firms’ efforts in gaining access to the required configuration 
capabilities may take the two forms of capability extension or capability deepening (Karim & 
Mitchell, 2000). When firms pursue capability deepening, they typically build on their 
current capabilities and tend to accumulate capabilities that are similar to a firm’s existing 
capabilities. However, when they pursue capability extension, the focus of capability 
reconfiguration is on addition of new capabilities that are distinct from a firms’ current 
capability portfolio. Depending on their initial position, firms differ in the extent to which 
they engage in capability deepening versus capability extension for gaining access to the 
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required technical capabilities and specialized complementary assets. Drawing on Table 3-1, 
I discuss these differences for incumbents, de novo startups and diversifying entrants.  
Industry incumbents of the prior industry regime may benefit from their stock of 
specialized complementary assets which retain value in the nascent context. However, their 
technical capabilities are likely to have become obsolete at the face of the technological 
discontinuity associated with the nascent industry. Thus, while incumbents are likely to 
leverage their specialized complementary assets to the nascent industry context, it is 
important that they strategically renew themselves and build technical capabilities from 
scratch. Accordingly, their reconfiguration efforts are likely to focus on gaining access to the 
technical capabilities which are distinct from their existing obsolete technical capabilities and 
take the form of capability extension. For specialized complementary assets, however, they 
are more likely to engage in capability deepening.  
In narrowing their capability gap, diversifying entrants need to advance their existing 
technical capabilities. Even though they leverage some related technical capabilities to the 
focal industry, these technical capabilities often provide the basis for further capability 
development and acquisition. In fact, the initial technical capabilities are rarely adequate or 
in the right format for operations in the nascent industry. For instance, when petroleum firms 
initiated investments in synthetic fuels, they leveraged key technical capabilities to the new 
domain. However, those technical capabilities needed to be expanded by further engaging in 
R&D (Helfat, 1997). Hence, diversifying entrants are likely to engage in capability 
deepening to achieve the required mass and configuration of technical capabilities. 
Furthermore, given their lack of prior activity in the nascent industry, they have not 
accumulated specialized complementary assets and need to build them anew. In doing so, 
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addition of specialized complementary assets to their capability portfolio resembles 
capability extension.  
Given the similarities between diversifying and de novo entrants in terms of their 
initial access to technical capabilities and specialized complementary assets, the content of de 
novo entrants’ capability reconfiguration follows a similar pattern as diversifying entrants. It 
should be noted that the idiosyncrasies of technical capabilities of de novo and diversifying 
entrants may differ. For example, related technical capabilities of diversifying entrants may 
result from their prior activities in related technological domains, whereas de novo firms’ 
technical capabilities may be in the focal technological domain. Nonetheless, both types of 
firms need to append to their technical capabilities and engage in capability deepening.  
To summarize, incumbents are more likely to engage in capability extension for 
achieving the required portfolio of technical capabilities, while startups and diversifying 
firms are more likely to engage in capability deepening for achieving the required portfolio 
of technical capabilities. For obtaining specialized complementary assets, incumbents are 
more likely to engage in capability deepening, while startups and diversifying firms are more 
likely to engage in capability extension.  
 “Sequence” of Capability Reconfiguration Strategies 
Although the previous section indicates that potential entrants are likely to converge 
in terms of the content of their capability reconfiguration strategies and focus on including 
technical capabilities of the nascent industry context and specialized complementary assets in 
their capability portfolio, it is likely that they undertake divergent paths. In particular, they 
may sequence their activities very differently. In this section, I provide theoretical 
propositions regarding the sequence of activities that heterogeneous firms pursue.  
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The focus of industry incumbents of the obsolescing industry is to engage in 
capability deepening of specialized complementary assets, and capability extension of 
technical capabilities. For these firms, it is more important to gain access to the technical 
capabilities of the nascent field than to further enhance their stock of complementary assets 
for a number of reasons. First, without gaining access to the technical capabilities of the 
nascent field, industry incumbents are not able to utilize their specialized complementary 
assets for introduction of commercial products. The value of specialized complementary 
assets arises due to facilitating product commercialization and value appropriation from 
technical capabilities. Thus, it is likely that industry incumbents would take a satisficing 
approach with regard to their initial stock of complementary assets and put higher priority on 
developing technical capabilities. Second, incumbents are likely to be among the late entrants 
to a nascent industry due to their lower incentives for investment in a nascent technology 
field and organizational inertia in perception of new opportunities. Hence, when they initiate 
their reconfiguration toward the nascent industry, not only do they face a capability gap 
relative to the requirements of the nascent industry, but also they lag behind the other two 
types of potential entrants. Accordingly, they need to compensate for their lack of asset mass 
efficiencies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) and absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) by 
emphasizing on narrowing the gap in terms of technical capabilities and allocate all their 
efforts in doing so. This prioritized allocation of efforts across the two reconfiguration 
strategies implies that strategic actions related to extension of technical capabilities is likely 
to precede deepening of specialized complementary assets. Therefore, I suggest: 
Proposition 1a: Incumbents are likely to engage in extension of technical capabilities prior 




Unlike incumbents that may prioritize across different activities, diversifying entrants 
are likely to engage in concurrent efforts for deepening of technical capability and extension 
of specialized complementary assets. Diversifying entrants are less likely to be encumbered 
by their past experiences and thus may benefit from the right cognitive framing with regard 
to the nascent industry. Their greater incentives for investment and their cognition advantage 
imply that they are among the early cohort of potential entrants and have more time 
flexibility in experimenting with various arrangements of required capabilities. Hence, there 
is less need for them to prioritize between deepening of technical capability and extension of 
specialized complementary assets. Moreover, due to their generic complementary assets such 
as the ability to manage businesses, the ability to conduct alliances and acquisitions, and 
access to financial capital, they are capable of pursuit of deepening of technical capability 
and extension of specialized complementary assets at the same time. Therefore, I suggest: 
Proposition 1b: Diversifying entrants are likely to engage in deepening of technical 
capabilities concurrent with extension of specialized complementary assets. 
  
Startups are, however, constrained in terms of their access to generic complementary 
assets. Not only do they lack financial capital for funding various reconfiguration efforts, but 
they are also less likely to benefit from general managerial capabilities required for pursuit of 
alternative modes of change such as alliances and acquisitions. Thus, it is less likely that they 
concurrently pursue extension of specialized complementary assets and deepening of 
technical capability. The key question for them is which activity to focus on. Given that their 
technical capability is their potential source of competitive advantage moving forward in the 
nascent industry, I suggest that they give higher priority to deepening of technical capabilities 
over extension of specialized complementary assets. If startups allocate all of their efforts to 
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gaining access to specialized complementary assets, they may have less financial capital and 
managerial resources to devote to accumulating additional technical capabilities. This is 
despite the possibility that they are less likely to reap any economic value from extension of 
specialized complementary assets without additional accumulation of technical capabilities. 
Hence, they are more likely to delay extension of complementary assets to a time when they 
have achieved the required mass of technical capabilities. Thus, I suggest:  
Proposition 1c: De novo entrants are likely to engage in deepening of technical capabilities 
prior to extension of specialized complementary assets.  
 
External versus Internal “Sources” for Capability Reconfiguration 
Another important aspect of reconfiguration efforts for potential entrants when 
entering into a nascent industry is to decide whether to draw on internal or external sources 
of capabilities. When drawing on in internal sources of capabilities, firms create a new 
capability within their existing boundaries by recombining their existing capabilities. When 
engaging in external capability sourcing, firms draw on capabilities that exist outside of their 
boundaries through mechanisms such as acquisitions, alliances, and in-licensing. Internal 
capability development and external sourcing of capabilities are two points of a continuum. 
In discussing these possible sources of capabilities, I consider the dominant source for each 
type of firm. However, some firms may evenly distribute their efforts between internal and 
external sources (Parmigiani, 2007), which I refer to as plural sourcing of capabilities.  
There are advantages and disadvantages associated with drawing on each of these 
sources of capability. In general, internal capability development is likely to be more 
effective when the size of the capability gap is small (Capron & Mitchell, 2009; Helfat & 
Lieberman, 2002). In these conditions, firms benefit from their absorptive capacity (Cohen & 
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Levinthal, 1990) and pursue a path-dependent process of accumulating additional capabilities 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). However, there is a risk that the path-dependency in a firm’s 
capability development efforts leads to organizational inertia and obsolescence of 
capabilities. On the other hand, external capability sourcing provides firms a way to source 
capabilities that are distinct from their existing capabilities (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) and 
overcome time compression diseconomies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Nonetheless, firms 
should have experience in implementation of external sourcing mechanisms (Kale, Dyer & 
Singh, 2002; Sampson, 2005; Zollo & Singh, 2004), and effective integration of externally 
sourced capabilities with their in-house capabilities (Karim & Mitchell, 2004). Drawing on 
the insights from this literature, I next discuss how potential entrants differ in the extent to 
which they draw on internal versus external sources of capabilities. 
For industry incumbents, external sourcing of technical capability is likely to be the 
dominant mode. Given the size of the industry incumbents’ technical capability gap, external 
sourcing enables them to narrow their capability gap effectively and quickly. Moreover, 
industry incumbents’ efforts in internal capability development may be impeded due to their 
limited cognitive framing of the opportunities in the nascent industry context. However, 
external sourcing of technical capability is likely to alleviate these concerns. Furthermore, 
generic complementary assets of industry incumbents facilitate their undertaking of external 
sourcing mechanisms such as alliances and acquisitions. With regard to deepening of 
specialized complementary assets, it is likely that industry incumbents build on their initial 
stock of specialized complementary assets and draw on their internal sources of capabilities. 
Therefore, I suggest:  
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Proposition 2a: Incumbents are likely to engage in extension of technical capabilities 
through external sources.  
Proposition 2b: Incumbents are likely to engage in deepening of specialized complementary 
assets through internal sources.  
 
Diversifying entrants’ initial stock of technical capabilities enables their effort in 
internal capability development. Given the size of their technical capability gap, internal 
capability development becomes feasible for these firms. In addition, their access to generic 
complementary assets such as financial capital and the ability to use alternative modes of 
change is likely to make external sourcing of technical capabilities also a considerable 
option. When drawing on external sources of capabilities, they may append additional 
components to their existing technical capability portfolio and be able to engage in 
experimentation regarding alternative configurations of technical capabilities. I suggest that 
diversifying entrants engage in plural sourcing of technical capabilities so that they benefit 
from the advantages of both internal and external sources. For gaining access to specialized 
complementary assets, however, the size of capability gaps implies that external sourcing is 
more effective. In particular, because of diversifying entrants’ experiences in previous value 
chains, they are likely to be able to integrate the externally sourced specialized 
complementary assets within their value chain.  
Thus, I suggest: 
Proposition 3a: Diversifying entrants are likely to engage in deepening of technical 
capabilities through plural sourcing.  
Proposition 3b: Diversifying entrants are likely to engage in extension of specialized 




For de novo startups, internal development of technical capabilities is likely to be the 
effective mode to deepen their capability base. Their initial access to technical capabilities 
provides a starting point for further recombination and development of new capabilities. 
Unlike diversifying entrants, they are less likely to benefit from generic complementary 
assets that facilitate external sourcing of technical capabilities. Moreover, they may not be 
capable of integrating externally sourced technical capabilities with their in-house 
capabilities. Therefore, external sourcing of technical capabilities is less likely to be pursued. 
De novo startups’ initial lack of access to specialized complementary assets implies 
that they have difficulty in internal development of specialized complementary assets. Given 
that external sourcing may provide a speedy way to access these assets and compensate for 
the startups’ initial position, extension of specialized complementary assets is likely to draw 
on external sources. It should also be noted that although this is the dominant source of 
specialized complementary assets for startups, they may face critical challenges in pursuing 
external sourcing mechanisms such as acquisition due to their lack of prior experiences and 
lack of adequate financial resources.  
Therefore, I suggest: 
Proposition 4a: De novo entrants are likely to engage in deepening of technical capabilities 
through internal sources.  
Proposition 4b: De novo entrants are likely to engage in extension of specialized 
complementary assets through external sources. 
 
Taken together, these propositions highlight that due to the differential historical 
antecedents, incumbents of the obsolescing industry, de novo startups and diversifying firms 
differ in how they pursue capability extension and capability deepening for achieving the 




To illustrate the implication of my theoretical propositions, I provide abbreviated case 
histories of three firms in the agricultural biotechnology industry: DeKalb Genetics, 
Monsanto and Mycogen. First, I briefly describe the industry context of agricultural 
biotechnology and the capability requirements for entry into this nascent industry. I then 
provide a detailed discussion of the reconfiguration strategies that these three firms pursued 
since their initial technological investments in the industry. This discussion is based on 
information available in various secondary sources such as the USDA Biotechnology 
Research Service, the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, the OECD BioTrack database,  
LexisNexis, SDC Platinum, Delphion, websites of firms, and their SEC filings.  
The choice of these three firms is based on a number of reasons. First, given that my 
propositions focus on the differences across incumbents of the obsolescing industry, 
diversifying firms, and startups, I selected one firm from each category. DeKalb Genetics, 
Monsanto and Mycogen serve as examples of an incumbent, a diversifying firm, and a 
startup, respectively. Second, I selected firms that have achieved the required configuration 
of technical capabilities and specialized complementary assets at least to some extent so that 
description of their capability reconfiguration strategies in anticipation of entry into the 
agricultural biotechnology becomes meaningful. Finally, these three firms have all invested 
in the agricultural biotechnology in the same time period and thus faced similar 
environmental and industry context as they engaged in heterogeneous reconfiguration 
strategies. This method for selection of cases is consistent with the recommendations that 
illustrative cases may be chosen based on theoretical criteria rather than statistical sampling 
criteria (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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Overview of the Agricultural Biotechnology Industry 
Agricultural biotechnology is the use of modern biotechnology techniques to improve 
or modify plants with a particular focus on enhancing agricultural traits such as herbicide 
tolerance, pest resistance, and resistance to environmental stresses. This industry builds on a 
scientific discovery in 1977 that showed viability of genetic modification of plants. This 
scientific discovery laid the foundation for inception of the agricultural biotechnology 
industry when the first product of the agricultural biotechnology was introduced in 1995.  
In the aftermath of this scientific discovery, firms with diverse historical backgrounds 
committed resources to transforming the technological opportunity related to agricultural 
biotechnology to a product with commercial value. Specifically, three types of firms that 
invested in agricultural biotechnology were: incumbents of the conventional agriculture 
industry, de novo startups, and diversifying firms from related industries, particularly 
chemical. Regardless of their type, these different firms focused their reconfiguration efforts 
in gaining access to technical capabilities and specialized complementary assets required for 
operations in the nascent industry. In the context of agricultural biotechnology, expertise in 
plant biotechnology  i.e., knowledge of gene sequences as well as methods of genetic 
transformation of plants  is considered the key technical capability, while access to elite 
varieties of crops  i.e., crop varieties that have been bred to show superior characteristics 
sought by farmers in each agro-climatic condition  is considered the key specialized 
complementary asset. In the second essay of my dissertation, I provided an in-depth 
discussion of these capability requirements using the example pest-resistant soybeans.15  
                                                 
15 Please see page 67. 
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DeKalb Genetics, 1982-1997 
DeKalb Corporation, founded in 1917, was a producer and supplier of agricultural 
products and services. Given its prior activity in the conventional agriculture industry, I 
categorize DeKalb Corporation as an industry incumbent. Prior to introduction of agricultural 
biotechnology, DeKalb Corporation relied on plant breeding capabilities to introduce elite 
varieties of crops. However, the advent of biotechnology and the associated discontinuous 
technological shock implied that plant breeding capabilities were no longer adequate and that 
firms needed to integrate plant breeding techniques with modern biotechnology for entry into 
the nascent field.  
In 1982 and at the face of the technological changes in the agricultural biotechnology, 
DeKalb initiated technological investments toward this nascent industry. The initial instance 
of DeKalb’s technological investment in agricultural biotechnology was formation of a joint 
venture with Pfizer Inc. DeKalb’s management team identified Pfizer’s technical capabilities 
in the field of plant biotechnology as a major reason for formation of this joint venture named 
DeKalb-Pfizer, mentioning that: “Pfizer's extensive genetic engineering research program 
gives the new venture the opportunity to lead in application of this significant new science to 
the improvement of our products” (PR Newswire, 1982). Following this initial technological 
investment, DeKalb pursued a number of additional capability reconfiguration strategies till 
its first product commercialization and entry into agricultural biotechnology industry in 1997. 
Capability portfolio of DeKalb in 1982 was comprised of a strong endowment of 
specialized complementary assets. DeKalb was involved in development of elite varieties of 
crops for years. Not only did DeKalb possess plant breeding capabilities, but it also had 
access to numerous protected plant varieties. In terms of technical capabilities, however, it 
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was not considered to be in a strong position. During the 15 years since its technological 
investment in the industry by the time of its entry, DeKalb modified its portfolio of technical 
capabilities and specialized complementary assets in multiple ways.  Table 3-2 shows the 
timeline of major events in the history of DeKalb.  
[Table 3-2 about here] 
In order to enhance its technical capabilities and its plant biotechnology knowledge, 
DeKalb was involved in alliances with Pfizer (in 1982 and 1989), Calgene (in 1988), and 
DuPont (in 1996). It also pursued technological acquisitions of BioTechnica (in 1991) and 
MGI Pharma (in 1996). Since 1988 and buyback of shares in DeKalb-Pfizer joint venture, 
DeKalb changed its name to DeKalb Genetics and set up in-house research centers. Despite 
the existence of this in-house research center, DeKalb’s source of technical capabilities 
seemed to be mainly external sources. This observation is consistent with proposition 2a that 
incumbents are likely to engage in extension of technical capabilities through external 
sources. Drawing on these external sources of technical capabilities, DeKalb started 
conducting field trials and filing for agricultural biotechnology patents as early as 1990. Its 
endeavors in gaining access to technical capabilities of plant biotechnology culminated in 
1995 when it applied for a petition for non-regulated status for an herbicide tolerant corn 
genetic modification event. This application later turned into its first commercialized product 
in 1997. These outcomes imply that DeKalb’s efforts in modifying its technical capabilities 
were successful. 
For specialized complementary assets, DeKalb mainly relied on its internal units for 
deepening of its pre-existing stock of specialized complementary assets. Since 1982, it 
continued its research in plant breeding, obtained several new protected plant varieties for 
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corn and soybean, and also applied for several patents of elite corn and soybean varieties.  
DeKalb’s focus on internal sources for deepening of specialized complementary assets is 
consistent with proposition 2b.  
Also, the sequence of activities pursued by DeKalb may be modeled using some 
proxies of the extent to which it focused on reconfiguring its technical capabilities versus 
reconfiguring specialized complementary assets. The dotted line in Figure 3-1 shows the 
accumulated number of protected plant varieties that have been assigned to DeKalb. 
Protected plant varieties serve an indication of the extent to which a firm has access to 
specialized complementary assets within the context of agricultural biotechnology. The solid 
line shows the accumulated number of external technical capability sourcing activities that 
DeKalb pursued. The comparison of these two charts indicates that DeKalb focused on 
reconfiguring technical capabilities at an earlier time relative to reconfiguring its specialized 
complementary assets, which is consistent with proposition 1a. 
[Figure 3-1 about here] 
Mycogen, 1982-1998 
Mycogen was a startup founded in 1982 by a biochemist from Stanford University 
and a venture capitalist from the San Diego area. Because Mycogen was founded for the 
objective of operating in the agricultural biotechnology industry, I consider its initial 
investment in the agricultural biotechnology as its time of founding. Similar to other 
agricultural biotechnology startups, Mycogen leveraged technical capabilities to the nascent 
industry. However, it lacked specialized complementary assets. Initially, Mycogen was more 
focused on developing biological pesticide and plant protection products based on 
microorganisms. Later, it expanded its scope of operations to develop pesticide incorporated 
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plants. Its main technical capability, as evident through its patenting history and EPA 
records, was discovery of several toxins that can be encapsulated in transgenic plants and 
make them resistant to pests. Table 3-3 shows the timeline of major events in the history of 
Mycogen.  
[Table 3-3 about here] 
Given its portfolio of capabilities at the time of initial investment, reconfiguration 
efforts of Mycogen focused on further development of its plant biotechnology expertise as 
the critical technical capability and gaining access to plant breeding capability and elite 
varieties of crops as the critical specialized complementary assets. For deepening of its 
technical capabilities, Mycogen predominantly pursued in-house research and draw on the 
internal sources of technical capabilities available within its boundary. Its extensive patenting 
activity in the area of agricultural biotechnology is an indication of its strong in-house 
research. By 1992, Mycogen held 21 out of 39 US patents issued for strains of Bt toxin. In 
addition, these efforts were complemented with alliances with Monsanto (in 1987 and 1990), 
Lubrizol’s Agrigenetics unit (in 1992) and Ciba Seeds (in 1993). This record of activity is 
consistent with proposition 4a which suggests internal sources as the major source for 
technical capability deepening by startups. 
With regard to specialized complementary assets, Mycogen did not have a history of 
activity in the agriculture industry and lacked access to elite varieties of crops. In obtaining 
these specialized complementary assets, it mainly relied on external sources such as other 
seed firms and conventional agriculture firms. Alliances with Ciba Seeds (in 1993 and 1995), 
and Cargill (in 1996) as well acquisitions of United AgriSeeds (in 1996) and Morgan Seeds 
(in 1996) are examples of efforts in reconfiguring its portfolio of specialized complementary 
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assets through external sources. Given that Mycogen was not involved in any internal 
development of specialized complementary assets, this line of activity is strongly consistent 
with proposition 4b which suggests external sources as the major source for extension of 
specialized complementary assets by startups. 
The sequence of reconfiguration activities pursued by Mycogen is also consistent 
with proposition 1c in that deepening of technical capabilities precedes extension of 
specialized complementary assets. Figure 3-2 provides an illustration. The dashed line and 
the dotted line show the accumulated number of external technical capability sourcing 
activities and the accumulated number of patents as an indication of in-house research, 
respectively. The comparison with the solid line which shows the accumulated number of 
external specialized complementary assets sourcing activities indicates that Mycogen focused 
on reconfiguring technical capabilities at an earlier time relative to reconfiguring its 
specialized complementary assets. Prior to 1993, Mycogen devoted most of its resources and 
attention to development of technical capabilities. Jerry Caulder, CEO of Mycogen at the 
time, has once said: “By the early 1990s, it was apparent to us that biotechnology would be 
deployed in a manner that Mycogen was not organized to address. At that time, Mycogen did 
not have the capability to put genes into plants; it did not have the freedom to operate from 
an intellectual property standpoint; and it was not in the seed business in order to deliver the 
technology” (Kalaitzandonakes, 1997).  
 [Figure 3-2 about here] 
Monsanto, 1980-1995 
Monsanto was founded as a chemical company in 1901. Its first technological 
investment in the agricultural biotechnology related to its in-house research activities in 
115 
 
1980. Because of its background in the chemical industry, I categorize Monsanto as a 
diversifying firm that diversified from a related industry into the nascent agricultural 
biotechnology context. Similar to other diversified firms with chemical background, 
Monsanto lacked agricultural biotechnology capabilities in the either form of technical 
capabilities or specialized complementary assets prior to its investment. However, it was 
engaged in production of agriculture-related products such as herbicides and pesticides. In 
anticipation of entry into agricultural biotechnology industry, Monsanto sought to 
reconfigure both technical capabilities and specialized complementary assets. These efforts 
led to product commercialization by Monsanto in 1995. Table 3-4 shows the timeline of 
major events in the history of Monsanto.  
[Table 3-4 about here] 
In an effort to gain access to technical capabilities, Monsanto heavily relied on both 
internal and external sources of plant biotechnology expertise. Not only did it pursue a very 
strong in-house research center, but also it formed several alliances with other companies 
such as Biogen (in 1980), BioTechnica (in 1983), Ecogen (in 1987), Plant Genetics (in 1987), 
Mycogen (in 1990), Agracetus (in 1991) and Calgene (in 1993) as well as university 
scientists at the Washington University of Saint Louis. These efforts a concurrent focus on 
reconfigure technical capabilities drawing on both internal and external sources consistent 
with proposition 3a.  
For specialized complementary assets, Monsanto relied on external sources of 
capability. For example, it benefitted from elite varieties of crops and distribution channels of 
Ciba Seeds (in 1993) and Sandoz Seeds (in 1995). This record of activity is consistent with 




This essay provides theoretical propositions regarding a firm’s reconfiguration 
strategies in anticipation of entry to a nascent industry. I suggest that potential entrants to a 
nascent industry  i.e., incumbents of the obsolescing industry, de novo startups and 
diversifying entrants  are likely to pursue different reconfiguration strategies. While they all 
strive for gaining access to the critical configuration of technical capabilities and specialized 
complementary assets, the paths undertaken by these heterogeneous firms are different due to 
the differences in their historical antecedents. Specifically, they differ in the extent to which 
they pursue capability extension versus capability deepening, in the time sequence of 
pursuing different reconfiguration strategies, and in the source of capabilities.  
Discussion of three case histories of firms in the agricultural biotechnology illustrates 
some of the implications of the model, and elaborates on the nature of reconfiguration 
strategies that are pursued. For future research and in preparation for journal submission, I 
plan to extend this essay by appending additional qualitative and quantitative data to the 
descriptive case histories.  
Contributions of this essay to the strategic management literature are threefold. First, 
by delineating reconfiguration strategies undertaken by firms in anticipation of entry, this 
essay provides additional insights to the strategic renewal literature. The strategic renewal 
literature is interested in analyzing both the content and the process of firms’ reconfiguration 
strategies (Agarwal & Helfat, 2009). A key conclusion of this essay is that firms pursue 
divergent processes for achieving a convergent content. For example, while their generic 
complementary assets and cognitive frames required them to undertake different sequence of 
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activities or draw on different sources of capabilities, they were all focused on attaining a 
similar configuration of technical capabilities and specialized complementary assets. 
In addition, although existing literature has examined how industry incumbents 
reconfigure themselves at the face of a technological breakthrough that has rendered their 
capabilities obsolete (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Lavie, 2006), less attention has been devoted 
to how de novo and diversifying firms reconfigure their capability portfolio in anticipation of 
entry into an industry. This essay underscores that de novo and diversifying firms also 
engage in capability reconfigurations and that their capability reconfiguration efforts are 
critical for their entry. Indeed, entry of diversifying and de novo entrants to a nascent 
industry is accompanied by critical challenges related to reconfiguring themselves based on 
the requirements of the nascent industry. Therefore, industry incumbents are not the only 
firms that undergo reconfiguration. 
Finally, by examining the implications of firms’ heterogeneity in shaping their 
reconfiguration strategies, the third and final essay of my dissertation extends the literature 
that has connected a firm’s type to interim strategic decisions such as product demography 
(Khessina & Carroll, 2005), technology strategy (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007), and vertical 
integration (Qian, Agarwal & Hoetker, 2012). Historical antecedents of firms may impact the 
bundle of capabilities and cognitive frames that potential entrants leverage into a nascent 
industry. However, these underlying sources of heterogeneity are important because of how 
they translate into strategic activities that firms pursue. In this essay, capability 
reconfiguration efforts of firms in anticipation of entry into a nascent industry are discussed 




Table 3-1: Underpinning Sources of Heterogeneity across Firms 


























Y N N Y Y 
Diversifying 
firms 
Y N Y Y Y 
Industry 
incumbents 
N Y Y N N 
Y indicated that a column item is in favor of a firm’s operation within the nascent industry.  











1917 DeKalb Corporation was founded.   
1982 DeKalb Corporation and Pfizer Inc. formed a joint venture, DeKalb-Pfizer 
Genetics. 
 Initial investment  
Focus on technical 
capabilities 
1988 Agreement with Crop Genetics to conduct large-scale field trials and 
market Crop Genetics’ genetically engineered bio-insecticide directed 
against corn's major pest. 
  
1988 Agreement with Calgene to develop elite DeKalb hybrids containing the 
GlyphoTol(R)1 gene. 
 Focus on technical 
capabilities 
1988 DeKalb Corp spun off its agricultural genetics businesses, changing its 
name to DeKalb Genetics. 
  
1989 The DeKalb Genetics Corporation said it had agreed to buy Pfizer Inc.'s 30 
percent interest in DeKalb-Pfizer Genetics. 
  
1989 DeKalb Genetics said it would continue to conduct agricultural 
biotechnology research for at least five years at Pfizer's research center. 
 Focus on technical 
capabilities 
1990 First field trial application.   
1991 DeKalb Genetics acquired Plant Science Research from BioTechnica.  Focus on technical 
capabilities 
1995 Seeking petition for non-regulated status for HT corn.   
1996 DeKalb Genetic acquired certain non-core agricultural patents of MGI 
Pharma. 
 Focus on technical 
capabilities 
1996 DeKalb Genetics Corp and EI DuPont Nemours entered into a cross 
licensing agreement in which DeKalb received the rights to DuPont’s 
Biostic gene gun and DuPont received the right to nutritionally enhanced 
corn and soybeans. 
 Focus on technical 
capabilities 
1996 Monsanto acquired 38 percent of DeKalb Genetics share.   
1997 First transgenic trait (HT corn) sales.   
1998 Monsanto acquired 60 percent remaining shares of DeKalb Genetics.   











1982 Mycogen founded by David H. Rammler, a partner in the venture capital 
firm of Vanguard Associates, and Andrew C. Barnes, a biochemist. 
 Initial investment 
1984 First series of patent applications.   
1987 Initial public offering of 1.6 million shares of common stock    
1987 Agreement with Monsanto to benefit from Monsanto's microencapsulation 
delivery technology 
 Focus on technical 
capabilities 
1990 Agreement with Monsanto to develop plants resistant to nematode  Focus on technical 
capabilities 
1991 First approval of genetically engineered bio-insecticides for commercial 
sale by the Environmental Protection Agency. 
  
1992 Agreement with Lubrizol, Acquisition of Agrigenetics to generate pest 
resistant crop varieties to be commercialized through the seed business of 
Agrigenetics.  
 Focus on technical 
capabilities  
1993 First field trial application.   
1993 Agreement with Ciba Seeds  Focus on both technical 
capabilities and 
complementary assets 
1993 Agreement with Forage Genetics to introduce genes from Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt) bacteria into alfalfa varieties 
  
1995 Agreement with Pioneer Hi-Bred to develop transgenic crops with built-in 
insect resistance.   
  
1995 Agreement with Ciba Seeds to distribute Mycogen seeds  Focus on complementary 
assets 
1996  Agreement with Cargill to distribute Mycogen seeds  Focus on complementary 
assets 
1996 Agreement with DowElanco, Acquisition of United AgriSeeds  Focus on complementary 
assets 
1996 Acquisition of Morgan Seeds  Focus on complementary 
assets 
1998 Dow AgroSciences acquired Mycogen.   









1901 Monsanto was founded.   
1980  Agricultural biotechnology research center was established.  Initial investment  focus 
on technical capabilities 
1980 Research agreement with Biogen  Focus on technical 
capabilities  
1983 Announcement of a major technological discovery by Monsanto 
scientists 
  
1983 Research agreement with BioTechnica  Focus on technical 
capabilities  
1986 First field trial application.   
1987 Research agreement with Ecogen  Focus on technical 
capabilities  
1987 Research agreement with Plant Genetics  Focus on technical 
capabilities  
1990 Agreement with Mycogen  Focus on technical 
capabilities  
1991 Research agreement with Agracetus  Focus on technical 
capabilities  
1993 Research agreement with Calgene  Focus on technical 
capabilities  
1993 Agreement with Ciba Seeds  Focus on complementary 
assets 
1995 Agreement with Sandoz Seeds  Focus on complementary 
assets 
1995 First transgenic trait sales.   
2013 Monsanto continues its operations in agricultural biotechnology.   
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